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INTRODUCTION
The continuing debate over civil justice reform, replete
with colorful "lawyer-bashing," usually focuses on the purported explosion of civil litigation1 or the venality of American
lawyers. 2 Civil justice reform has proven to be such a popular
political hobbyhorse that numerous office-holders and candi3
dates made it a central theme of the 1992 electoral campaign.
The incessant demands for reform of civil legal services have
evolved into a civil justice reform movement characterized by
1. Many commentators, however, question the validity of the "litigation
explosion" problem. See, e.g., L. Gordon Crovitz, Supreme Court Exposes Journalists to the Litigation Explosion, WALL ST. J., June 26, 1991, at A9; L.
Gordon Crovitz, The Litigation Explosion and Quayle's Time Bomb, WALL ST.

J., May 15, 1991, at A15. A debate over the so-called litigation explosion was
inspired by WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED
WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAwSUIT (1991). See, e.g., Douglas H. Ginsburg, Law's ParadiseLost, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1609 (1992) (book review).
2. The phenomenon of lawyer bashing is regularly debated in the media.
See, e.g., Tom Baxter, Bush's Attack Bird Dan Quayle Adds Lawyer Bashing
To GOP Repertoire, L.A. DAILY J., Aug. 20, 1991, at 6; John P. Bracken, Current Lawyer-Bashing Undermines Attorney Role in Administering Justice,
N.Y.L.J., May 1, 1992, at S4; Terence Moran, Calling Bush's Lawyer Bashing
Bluff, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 14, 1992, at 27.
3. See, e.g., Kevin Sack, The 1992 Campaign: The Vice President; Quayle
Says Letter Shows Lawyers 'Own' Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1992, at A16.
During the 1992 presidential campaign, the Republican candidates and their
supporters advocated civil justice reform through the broadcast media as well.
See, e.g., The 92 Vote: The Vice PresidentialDebate (ABC television broadcast,
Oct. 13, 1992), transcript available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Script file (statement of Vice President Dan Quayle noting small businesspeople's desire for
civil justice reform due to costs and delays).
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the creation of advisory groups; 4 the production of white papers, reports, and studies; 5 and even executive orders for civil
6
justice reform.
In 1990, Congress responded with the Civil Justice Reform
Act.7 The Act created an advisory rulemaking group for each
of the ninety-four federal district courts, and required each
group to formulate an expense and delay reduction plan by the
end of 1993.8
This Article is the conclusion to a piece published earlier in
4. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Planning in the Montana Federal
District,53 MONT. L. REV. 239 (1992) (tracking civil justice reform in Montana
and nationally); Joseph C. Wilkinson, Jr., Civil Justice Reform Act Advisory
Groups in Louisiana,40 LA. B. J. 165 (Aug. 1992); Junda Woo, Arizona Overhauls Civil-Justice System in an Effort to Unclog State's Courts, WALL ST. J.,
June 30, 1992, at B7 (noting Arizona reform plans).
5. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CONSORTIUM ON LEGAL SERVICES
AND THE PUBLIC, CIVIL JUSTICE: AN AGENDA FOR THE 1990S; PAPERS OF THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE
IN THE 1990S (1989); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CONSORTIUM ON LEGAL
SERVICES AND THE PUBLIC, CIVIL JUSTICE: AN AGENDA FOR THE 1990s; REPORT
OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ACCESS TO
JUSTICE IN THE 1990S (1989); BROOKINGS INST., JUSTICE FOR ALL:

REDUCING

COSTS AND DELAYS IN CIVIL LITIGATION (1989); A REPORT FROM THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN
AMERICA (1991); FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITEE, REPORT (1990).

6. The executive branch has also entered the fray. See Exec. Order No.
12,778, 3 C.F.R. 359 (1992) (imposing civil justice reform measures on all executive branch departments and agencies).
7. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. II 1990)). The Civil Justice Reform Act
constitutes Title I of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101650, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). For Congress's
views on the need for this legislation, see S. REP. No. 416, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
13 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6852; H.R. REP. No. 733, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1990). For a favorable summary of the Civil Justice Reform
Act by the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee and chief proponent
of the legislation, see generally Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Equal, Accessible, Affordable Justice Under Law: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 1 CORNELL J.
LAW PUB. POL. 1 (1992). But see D. Jeffrey Campbell & Jonathan R. Kuhlman, Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990: An Experiment Gone Awry, 60 DEFENSE COUNSEL J. 17 (1993) (discussing the unworkabiity of already
implemented expense and delay reduction plans); Carl Tobias, Civil Justice
Reform and the Balkanization of Federal Civil Procedure, 24 ARIz. ST. L.J.
1393 (1992); Carl Tobias, Recalibratingthe Civil Justice Reform Act, 30 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 115 (1993).

8. Civil Justice Reform Act § 103(a), (b), 104 Stat. at 5089-96. See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Civil Justice Reform Comes to the Southern District of
Texas: Creating and Implementing a Cost and Reduction Plan Under the
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 11 REV. LITIG. 165 (1992).
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this volume of the Minnesota Law Review.9 The earlier piece
explained that the Civil Justice Reform Act effected a revolutionary redistribution of procedural rulemaking power from
the federal judicial branch to the federal legislative branch. 10
It focused on three aspects of the Act.
First, the Civil Justice Reform Act effectively overturns
the Rules Enabling Act" by the expedient of declaring procedural rules to be substantive law, thus stripping the judicial
branch of the power to prescribe internal rules of procedure for
the federal courts. 12 Second, the Act violates the separation-ofpowers doctrine by arrogating to Congress unprecedented authority over the internal affairs of the judiciary.13 With inadequate legal and empirical foundation, Congress stripped the
judicial branch of its important rulemaking function. Third,
the Act constitutes a vast experiment in local rulemaking that
undermines the central procedural reformation effected by the
promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938.14
The 1938 procedural reformation embodied the aesthetic that
the careful, informed study would lead to the adoption and
amendment of simple, uniform procedural rules throughout the
federal judicial system.
The reform the Civil Justice Reform Act mandates, however, is not conducive to careful, informed amendment of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover, it is doubtful that
the ninety-four local advisory groups will recommend simple,
much less uniform, rules. On the contrary, the Civil Justice
Reform Act encourages, if not requires, a proliferation of local
9. Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformationin ProceduralJustice,77
MINN. L. REV. 375 (1992).
10. Id. at 379 (noting that Congress took power from judges and their expert advisors and delegated it to local lawyers and lay people). The earlier Article argues that the true significance of the Civil Justice Reform Act is not in
the nuts and bolts of procedural innovation and reform that the ninety-four
district advisory groups accomplish under the Act, and that most commentary,
to date, focuses on these accomplishments under the legislation. Id. at 378-79.
In June 1992, the Administrative Office of the United States Courts issued a
progress report for the United States Judicial Conference on the pilot and
early implementation district plans. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACr REPORT: DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF PLANS BY EARLY IMPLEMENTATION DISTRICTS AND PILOT

COURTS (1992) [hereinafter CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT REPORT].

11.
12.
13.
14.

28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
See Mullenix, supra note 9, at 379.
Id. at 382.
Id. at 380.
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rules of increasing complexity and specificity. 15 Hence, the.
Civil Justice Reform Act is actually a counter-reformation of
procedural justice.
In sum, the earlier Article argued that the implications of
the Civil Justice Reform Act are dramatic, revolutionary, and
probably bad.
Under the Act, grassroots, amateur local
rulemaking groups will recommend problematic local rules,
measures, and programs based not on considered contemplative
study, but rather on ill-conceived social science, anecdote, and
interest-group lobbying. More significantly, the Act will contribute to the increased balkanization of federal civil procedure
and transform the reigning procedural aesthetic of simplicity
and uniformity into one of increasing complexity and
6
variation.'
This Article examines the legal basis for the Civil Justice
Reform Act. It concludes that the Act revokes the Rules Enabling Act sub silentio and authorizes unconstitutional
rulemaking. Central to this thesis is the argument that the
Civil Justice Reform Act violates the separation-of-powers doctrine by substantially impairing the federal courts' inherent Article III power to control their internal process and the conduct
of civil litigation. Furthermore, Congress is wrong in declaring-as it does in the legislative history to the Act-that it has
exclusive federal rulemaking power.17 Apart from these objections, the Civil Justice Reform Act ought to be condemned for
the pragmatic reason that it will irretrievably politicize federal
procedural rulemaking. Whatever legal arguments may be
marshalled against the Civil Justice Reform Act, this legislation also embodies deceptively high-minded but nonetheless illconceived public policy.
Part I of this Article examines whether the Civil Justice
Reform Act violates the separation-of-powers doctrine. It first
briefly canvasses the separation-of-powers decisions that deal
with executive/legislative and executive/judicial branch conflicts, and concludes that these cases are not particularly useful
15. Id.; see also CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT REPORT, supra note 10 (summarizing the array of rulemaking efforts of the pilot and early implementation

districts). Furthermore, the advisory groups created under the Civil Justice
Reform Act pursue their reform agendas parallel to the federal Advisory

Committee on Civil Rules, which continues to draft revisions to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure-a situation I characterize as inducing incredible procedural babel. Mullenix, supra note 9, at 381.
16. See Mullenix, supra note 9, at 380.
17. Id at 382.
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for evaluating the legislative/judicial branch conflict presented
by the Civil Justice Reform Act. This Part explains that the
Act poses a boundary question regarding the concurrent exercise of rulemaking powers by two separate branches of our federal government.
After determining the possible
methodologies a federal court might use in construing the Act's
constitutionality, Part I concludes that Congress, through the
Civil Justice Reform Act, has violated the separation-of-powers
doctrine by exercising authority that is beyond its Article I
powers, consequently intruding on powers Article III assigns to
the judiciary.
Part II evaluates whether the Civil Justice Reform Act
contravenes the Rules Enabling Act. This Part first explores
the allocation of rulemaking powers and discusses the historical
and doctrinal underpinnings of the substantive/procedural
rulemaking distinction embodied in the Rules Enabling Act.
The case law construing the Rules Enabling Act provides an inapt analytical framework for considering the Civil Justice Reform Act because past Rules Enabling Act challenges to courtmade rules typically have posed the question whether the judiciary, in promulgating a particular rule, has violated the Rules
Enabling Act. The Civil Justice Reform Act, in contrast, poses
the obverse issue: whether Congress, in enacting this legislation, has transgressed its own Rules Enabling Act. Part II also
discusses the implications for procedural rulemaking of Congress's 1988 amendment to the Rules Enabling Act, and concludes that, notwithstanding Congress's requirement of a more
open process, the Rules Enabling Act still allocates procedural
rulemaking power to the judicial branch.
Finally, Part II argues that the Senate's interpretation of
the Rules Enabling Act has inverted the usual understanding of
that Act and has transformed it from enabling legislation to
disabling legislation. In so doing, Congress has committed two
dangerous offenses: it has stripped the courts of their traditional procedural rulemaking authority, and it has changed procedural rules into substantive provisions. Thus the Civil
Justice Reform Act shifts the locus of rulemaking authority
away from the federal courts, where it always has been exercised, and relocates it in Congress-a branch ill-suited to judicial rulemaking. The Article closes with the author's repeated
not to be a matter of
refrain that procedural rulemaking ought
8
majoritarian legislative public policy.'
18. See id. at 384; see also Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience:
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I. THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT AND THE
SEPARATION-OF-POWERS DOCTRINE
A.

THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT AS AN IDIOSYNCRATIC
SEPARATION-OF-POWERS PROBLEM

The Civil Justice Reform Act presents a subtle, if not idiosyncratic, separation-of-powers problem. The Senate Judiciary
Committee highlighted the peculiar nature of this problem by
its repeated insistence that the Act presented no separation-ofpowers problems.' 9 Rather, the Senate deflected the separation-of-powers concerns the American Bar Association and the
Judicial Conference raised by characterizing them as challenges
"most often cloaked in separation-of-powers terms. '20
Although the Senate made some attempt to defend its rulemaking authority under the Rules Enabling Act,2 ' it perfunctorily
dismissed all separation-of-powers challenges.
The Senate's failure to address the separation-of-powers issue that the Civil Justice Reform Act raises is important for
three reasons. First, the Senate's minimal treatment of the
separation-of-powers issue suggests its inability to distinguish
between the statutory question posed by the Rules Enabling
Act and the more fundamental problem posed by the Constitution's mandate of separate legislative and judicial functions.
Second, the Senate's pejorative characterization of the challenge as merely a "cloak," rather than a "real" argument, represents a blatant reproach of the judiciary. The Senate's heavyhanded usurpation of rulemaking authority, coupled with its
dismissive attitude towards power allocation, exemplifies the
very tensions the Constitution sought to resolve through the
separation of powers. Third, the Senate's refusal to even consider the separation-of-powers problem represents either covert
ignorance or overt disregard. 22 By failing to resolve this issue,
Congress has ensured that the Civil Justice Reform Act will be
vulnerable to constitutional attack.
Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L.
REv. 795, 843-57 (1991) (questioning legislative promulgation of procedural

rules).
19. See S. REP. No. 416, supra note 7, at 9-10, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6811-13; see also Mullenix, supra note 9, at 434-35 (discussing
the Senate's failure to address separation-of-powers questions raised by the
American Bar Association and the Judicial Conference of the United States

Courts).
20. Mullenix, supra note 9, at 435.
21. Id.
22. I
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1.

Some Preliminary Observations on Separation-of-Powers
Interpretation

a.

The Cases and Commentary: Lessons for a Separation-ofPowers Argument

Separation-of-powers cases, which have continued to command the attention of both the Supreme Court23 and the coma
mentators, 2 4 generally embody one of two approaches:
23. See, e.g., Touby v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1752 (1991) (challenging
Controlled Substances Act's delegation of authority to the Attorney General to
list products that would subject violators to criminal prosecution); Freytag v.
Commissioner, 111 S. Ct. 2631 (1991) (challenging Congress's allocation to Tax
Court of authority to appoint special magistrates); Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 111 S. Ct.
2298 (1991) (challenging congressional creation and control of the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361
(1989) (challenging Sentencing Guidelines); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654
(1988) (challenging independent counsel scheme); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S.
714 (1986) (challenging Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act delegation of budgetcutting authority to the Comptroller General); Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) (challenging provisions of the Commodities Exchange Act relating to pendent claims); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co.
v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (challenging constitutionality of
provisions of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978).
24. There is an enormous literature relating to separation-of-powers issues. See generally SEPARATION OF PowERs--DoEs IT STILL WORK? (Robert
A. Goldwin & Art Kaufman eds., 1986); WILLIAM B. GWYN, THE MEANING OF
THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (Tulane Studies in Political Science No. 9, 1965).
For articles dealing with various aspects of separation-of-powers theory during
the last decade, see generally Dean Alfange, Jr., The Supreme Court and The
Separation of Powers: A Welcome Return To Normalcy?, 58 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 668 (1990); Rebecca L. Brown, SeparatedPowers and Ordered Liberty,
139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513 (1991); Stephen L. Carter, Constitutional Improprieties: Reflections on Mistretta, Morrison, and Administrative Government, 57
U. CHI. L. REV. 357 (1990) [hereinafter Carter, ConstitutionalImproprieties];
Stephen L. Carter, The Independent Counsel Mess, 102 HARV. L. REV. 105
(1988) [hereinafter Carter, The Independent Counsel Mess]; Stephen L. Carter,
From Sick Chicken to Synar: The Evolution and Subsequent De-Evolution of
the Separation of Powers, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REv. 719 [hereinafter Carter, From
Sick Chicken to Synar]; Erwin Chemerinsky, A Paradox Without Principle: A
Comment on the Burger Court'sJurisprudencein Separation of Powers Cases,
60 S. CAL.L. REV. 1083 (1987); E. Donald Elliott, Why Our Separation of Powers Jurisprudence Is So Abysmal, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 506 (1989); Paul
Gewirtz, Realism in Separationof Powers Thinking, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV.
343 (1989); William B. Gwyn, The Indeterminacy of the Separation of Powers
in the Age of the Framers, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 263 (1989); Harold J.
Krent, Separating the Strands in Separation of Powers Controversies, 74 VA.
L. REv. 1253 (1988); Phillip A. Kurland, The Rise and Fallof the "Doctrine" of
Separationof Powers, 85 MICH. L. REV. 592 (1986); Lewis J. Liman, The ConstitutionalInfirmities of the United States Sentencing Commission, 96 YALE
L.J. 1363 (1987); Alan Morrison, A Non-Power Looks at Separation of Powers,
79 GEo. L.J. 281 (1990); Theodore B. Olson, Separation of Powers and The
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"formalist" or a "functionalist" approach. 25 Under the formalist approach, which stresses the independence of each branch, a
court evaluates separation problems through a strict construction of the Constitution's first three articles, and finds a separation violation where a power specifically given to one branch is
delegated to or exercised by another.2 6 Justices who favor
Supreme Court: Implications and Possible Trends, 6 ADMIN. L.J. 266 (1992);
Richard J. Pierce, Separation of Powers and the Limits of Independence, 30
WM. & MARY L. REV.365 (1989); Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, ' Zf
Angels Were to Govern': The Need for PragmaticFormalismin Separationof

Powers Theory, 41 DuKE L.J. 449 (1991); Thomas 0. Sargentich, The ContemporaryDebate About the Legislative-Executive Separationof Powers,72 CORNELL
L. REV. 430 (1987); Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to
Separation of Powers Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 488 (1987) [hereinafter Strauss, Formaland FunctionalApproaches]; Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government Separation of Powers
and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLuM. L. REV. 573 (1984) [hereinafter Strauss,
Place of Agencies in Government]; Paul R. Verkuil, Separationof Powers, the
Rule of Law, and the Idea of Independence, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301
(1989); Wendy E. Ackerman, Comment, Separation of Powers and Judicial
Service on Presidential Commissions, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 993 (1986); Candace
H. Beckett, Essay, Separation of Powers and Federalism: Their Impact on
Liberty and the Functioningof Our Government, 29 Wm.& MARY L. REV. 635
(1988); Jordan Fried, Student Essay, The Constitutionalityof the U.S. Sentencing Commission: An Analysis of the Role of the Judiciary,57 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 704 (1989).
Professor Geoffrey P. Miller has documented the increase in interest in
separation-of-powers issues in litigation, scholarly commentary, and constitutional law casebooks. Geoffrey P. Miller, From Compromise to Confrontation;
Separation of Powers in the Reagan Era, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv.401, 402-07
(1989).
25. Brown, supra note 24, at 1522-31 (identifying two major approaches,
the "formalist" and "functionalist" models); Krent, supra note 24 (discussing
the analytical models); see also Thomas W. Merrill, The ConstitutionalPrinciple of Separation of Powers, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 225, 225-35 (1991) ("unpacking" the formalist and functionalist approaches); Sargentich, supra note 24, at
434-44 (describing formalist and functionalist perspectives); Strauss, Formal
and FunctionalApproaches, supra note 24, at 526 (arguing that formalism is
too rigid to adequately describe modern governmental structure and inconsistent with the Framers' intent); Mark Tushnet, The Sentencing Commission
and ConstitutionalTheory: Bowls and Plateausin Separation of Powers Theory, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 581, 582-85 (1992) (arguing that the two approaches are
not that different); Suzanne P. Clair, Note, Separationof Powers: A New Look
At The FunctionalistApproach, 40 CASE W. L. REV.331, 340-42 (1989-90) (advocating functionalist approach for its malleability).
Professors Redish and Cisar identify six analytical models of the separation-of-powers doctrine: (1) a "functionalist" model, (2) a "judicial abdication"
model, (3) an "originalist" model, (4) a "conflict of interest" model, (5) an "ordered liberty" model, and (6) a "pragmatic formalist" model. See Redish &
Cisar, supra note 24, at 487-505 (advocating more vigorous enforcement of separation of powers).
26. For leading examples of the formalist approach to separation-of-pow-
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strict constructionism and an originalist view of constitutional
law also favor the formalist approach to separation questions.27
The functionalist approach, in contrast, posits that a complete separation of the three branches of government is impossible and that the Framers never intended such a separation.
This approach is premised on the pragmatic view that contemporary American government is a system of highly interdependent branches and agencies that should not jealously guard
23
power and prerogative, but rather share functions and tasks.
Justices who favor a functionalist approach to separation-ofpowers questions typically couch their analysis in terms of flex29
ibility and pragmatism.
Although the separation-of-powers cases are factually and
analytically varied,3 0 the Supreme Court's jurisprudence allows
some generalizations. 31 First, although the Court uses both the
ers questions, see Bowsher, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983); see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
27. See Olson, supra note 24, at 275-76 (analyzing the three 1991 Supreme
Court cases dealing with separation of powers, and identifying and forecasting
a five-four split among the Justices in favor of formalist separation-of-powers
theory). Olson identifies Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, Souter, and
Thomas as supporting a formalist approach. I&
28. See, e.g., Freytag v. Commissioner, 111 S. Ct. 2631 (1991) (upholding
statute authorizing chief judge of United States Tax Court to appoint and assign special trial judges); Touby v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1752 (1991) (upholding validity of statute delegating authority to Attorney General to
schedule controlled substances); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989)
(validating power and authority of U.S. Sentencing Commission to promulgate
sentencing guidelines); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (sustaining office
of independent counsel against a separation-of-powers challenge); Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) (validating provisions of
the Commodities Exchange Act permitting pendent claims); see also Krent,
supra note 24, at 1254, 1359; Kurland, supra note 24, at 597-98 (discussing
Madison's interpretation of Montesquieu's theory of separation of powers).
But see Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of
Aircraft Noise, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2298 (1991) (applying Chadha's formalist approach to invalidate Congress's creation of a review board and transfer of control of airports from Congress to local authority).
29. See Olson, supra note 24, at 275-76 (analyzing the Court's three most
recent separation-of-powers cases, and identifying Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, Stevens, and White as supporting a functionalist approach).
30. See supra notes 23, 26, 28.
31. Professor Brown has observed that application of the formalist approach nearly always results in a challenged measure being invalidated as a
violation of separation-of-powers doctrine, while the functionalist approach almost always results in the Court's upholding the challenged measure. Brown,
supra note 24, at 1528. The cases also routinely refer to the Federalist Paper
roots of the separation-of-powers concept. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
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functionalist and the formalist approaches, it favors the for-

mer.3 2 With a few exceptions, 33 the Court routinely asserts
that the Constitution contemplates shared power among the
three coordinate branches, and thus rejects the idea of a rigid
separation of the branches and their respective powers. 34 Thus,
the Court generally views separation-of-powers theory as one of
"accommodation and practicality, '35 requiring a "pragmatic,
flexible approach" that focuses on the "proper balance between
the coordinate branches. ' 36 In addition, although each branch
of government's initial interpretation of the Constitution is due
great respect from the others, the Court emphasizes that it is
37
the judiciary's province and duty to say what the law is.
Therefore the federal courts are not bound to follow another
38
branch's interpretation of the Constitution.
Furthermore, the Court often views separation-of-powers
theory in relation to the doctrine of checks and balances, a perspective that often coincides with the functionalist view of interbranch relations. 39 Thus, the Court has suggested that the
separation-of-powers doctrine complements the notion of
checks and balances by institutionalizing a "self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one
branch at the expense of another."40 Because the purpose of
the system of checks and balances is to prevent one branch of
government from dominating another, a court evaluating
whether the separation-of-powers principle has been breached
must consider whether one branch has prevented another from
accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions. When
919, 947-50 (1983) (citing THE FEDERALIST

Nos.

22, 73 (Alexander Hamilton),

Nos. 51, 62 (James Madison)).
32. Alfange, supra note 24, at 669-70 (discussing the development of the
separation-of-powers doctrine).
33. The Supreme Court clearly has not repudiated the formalist approach

to deciding separation-of-powers issues. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S.
714 (1986) (striking down budget provisions of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings

Act); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (striking down the one-house legislative veto).
34. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976) (per curiam).
35. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 999 (White, J., dissenting).
36. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 442-43 (1977).
37. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-05 (1974) (citing Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803)).
38. I& (citing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969)).
39. See Sargentich, supra note 24, at 438-44 (discussing separation-of-powers analysis in relation to moderate and extreme versions of checks-and-balances theory).
40. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (per curiam).
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there is potential for disruption, a court must then balance the
interests involved in the allocation of power.4 '
Notwithstanding the Court's regular reliance on stock generalizations concerning basic American government, the Court
also has recognized the problems in its own doctrinal elaboration of separation-of-powers theory. Because the formalist and
functionalist approaches are at odds, the Court's frequent recourse to both has created a body of case law that is justly criticized for being confused and incoherent. One of the few points
about which the commentators uniformly agree is that the
Court's separation-of-powers jurisprudence is thoroughly muddied.42 Indeed, even some Justices have criticized the Court's

separation-of-powers doctrine as "one of the most confusing
'4 3
and controversial areas of constitutional law.
Thus, while one may distill some broad set of fundamental
principles from the Court's decisions relating to separation-ofpowers theory, the overwhelming consensus of the critical acad41. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).
42. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 24, at 1517 ("The Court's treatment of the
constitutional separation of powers is an incoherent muddle."); Carter, Constitutional Improprieties,supra note 24, at 358-65 (discussing lack of coherent
theory in recent decisions); Carter, The Independent Counsel Mess, supra note
24, at 127-28 (arguing that Morrison was a reversal of the Court's development
of a formalist theory); Carter, From Sick Chicken to Synar, supra note 24, at
721 (stating that the Court has not been consistent in advocating either a formalist or a functionalist method); Chemerinsky, supra note 24, at 1085-86 (arguing that the Burger Court applied inconsistent methods to analyze
congressional and presidential actions in separation-of-powers cases); Elliott,
supra note 24, at 507 (arguing that the Court has failed to establish a coherent
body of policy and theory regarding separation of powers); Redish & Cisar,
supra note 24, at 450 (noting Court's "split personality" in wavering from formalist enforcement to functionalist rationalization of inter-branch incursions);
Strauss, Formal and FunctionalApproaches,supra note 24, at 489-96 (describing confused state of recent decisions); Arthur C. Leahy, Note, Mistretta v.
United States: Mistreatingthe Separationof Powers Doctrine?,27 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 209, 221-22 (1990) (arguing that Mistretta indicates that Morrison was
not a fluke, and that a return to functionalist analysis is a mistake).
Professor Brown has argued that the Court has employed only an ad hoc
approach that has avoided taking a stand on the structural values of the Constitution: "It has adopted no theory, embraced no doctrine, endorsed no philosophy, that would provide even a starting point for debate." Brown, supra
note 24, at 1531. But see Alfange, supra note 24, at 669-72 (arguing that cases
like Bowsher were a "passing phase"); Robert L. Stern, The Separationof Powers Cases: Not Really a Mess, 31 ARiz. L. REV. 461 (1989) (arguing in support
of the doctrinal consistency in Morrison and the functionalist approach to separation-of-powers theory that decision embodies).
43. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S.
50, 93 (1982) (White, J., dissenting) (citing Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 534
(1962) (Harlan, J., plurality opinion)).
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emy is that the Court's application of the doctrine amounts to
little more than unpredictable ad hoc justice. 44 Separation-ofpowers doctrine suffers from the twin ills of indeterminacy and
linguistic skepticism. 45 Furthermore, the ad hoc nature of separation-of-powers decisions makes it unlikely that the Court will
defer to the suggestion of some scholars that it ground its separation-of-powers opinions in some other principled basis, such
as due process6 or ordered liberty.47 Given the Court's doctrinal muddle and the split among the Justices in separation-ofpowers cases,48 it seems unlikely that any aggregation of Justices will soon adopt a new analytical framework advanced by
the Court's academic critics.
b.

The Structure of a PossibleSeparation-of-Powers
Argument Challengingthe Civil Justice Reform Act

Because the case law and commentary provide little guidance in determining a separation-of-powers violation, 49 potential litigants raising such a challenge to the Civil Justice
Reform Act need to assay the strengths and weaknesses of
their arguments under the competing analytical models. Moreover, because the formalist and functionalist approaches embody competing views of constitutional government, 50 litigants
44. See supra notes 26 and 28 (discussing varying Supreme Court interpretations of separation of powers).
45. See, e.g., Redish & Cisar, supra note 24, at 478-79 (noting that linguistic skepticism refers to the belief that there is not one sole meaning for terms
like "executive" or "legislative," and contending that while such words are capable of evolving new meanings over time, there are relatively stable, historically developed meanings that can be used to interpret the text of the
Constitution).
46. See, e.g., Verkuil, supra note 24, at 301 (arguing that due process
should be used to analyze separation-of-powers cases). But see Pierce, supra
note 24, at 365 (responding to and criticizing Verkuil's due process analytical
framework); Redish & Cisar, supra note 24, at 498-502 (same).
47. See Brown, supra note 24, at 1540-65 (arguing that the concept of ordered liberty would provide guidance to courts in analyzing separation-of-powers cases). But see Redish & Cisar, supra note 24, at 502-05 (criticizing
Brown's ordered liberty analytical model).
48. See supra note 27.
49. Scholarly proposals also lack a principled basis to provide guidance.
See, e.g., Brown, supra note 24, at 1530 (arguing that both the formalist and
functionalist approaches fail to consider the purpose for separating the powers
of government); Merrill, supra note 25, at 227 (noting that neither formalism
nor functionalism provide a satisfactory account of separation-of-powers doctrine in practice, and advocating a "minimalist conception" of separation of
powers).
50. See, e.g., Carter, From Sick Chicken to Synar, supra note 24, at 722-43
(discussing the views of government implicit in the development of formalist
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will find it difficult to structure a persuasive challenge without
knowing which approach the Court will apply.
This dilemma applies with great force to conflicts between
the judiciary and either the executive or legislative branch. Because Article III is the briefest of the three foundational Articles, a formalist challenge based on alleged incursions into the
judiciary's constitutional territory may be impossible,5 ' because
such a challenge would necessarily rely on a theory of the federal courts' non-explicit, inherent powers. Thus, a litigant's
most plausible challenge would have to be based on a functionalist view of interbranch relations.
The Civil Justice Reform Act presents an unusual separation-of-powers problem. Arguably the Act, including the assignment of rulemaking authority to advisory groups, bears all
the hallmarks of a constitutionally permissible legislative action within prevailing constitutional delegation doctrine: the
Act requires that each federal district court appoint the advisory group members and approve the proposed civil justice reform plans. To be successful, therefore, a separation-of-powers
challenge to the Act must demonstrate that the provisions requiring judicial action are merely hollow gestures to the judicial branch's rulemaking authority, and that the procedural
reforms that advisory groups recommend are congressionallyinspired, mandated, and enacted.
A separation-of-powers challenge to the Civil Justice Reform Act is likely to arise when some (disgruntled) litigant is
subjected to a new rule, measure, or program that a Civil Justice Reform Act advisory group has recommended pursuant to
its statutory mandates. The Civil Justice Reform Act basically
requires all ninety-four federal district courts to draft civil justice expense-and-delay reduction plans.52 The types of rules,
and functionalist views of separation of powers, which he refers to as de-evolutionary and evolutionary).
51. See United States v. Brainer, 515 F. Supp. 627, 631 (D.Md. 1981) (not-

ing that unlike Articles I and II,
Article III does not enumerate or describe
constitutional powers), rev'd, 691 F.2d 691 (4th Cir. 1982).

In Brainer, the

court noted that instances in which the Supreme Court has been faced with
statutes infringing on judicial independence are rare. I&i at 634.

52. See Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat.

5089 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. II 1990)); see also CIVIL JUSTICE
REFORM ACT REPORT, supra note 10 (progress report on development and implementation of Civil Justice Reform Act plans by pilot and early implementation districts); Biden, supra note 7; Mullenix, supra note 9, at 388-96
(describing the legislation and the congressional mandates to the advisory
groups in formulating their plans); Mullenix, supra note 8 (same). Thirty-four
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measures, and programs that seem ripe for challenge include
differentiated case tracking systems, discovery controls and
limitations (especially mandatory disclosure programs),
mandatory alternative dispute resolution referrals, and feeshifting provisions. 53 Such a challenge is especially likely in
those districts where the courts have implemented new rules
by applying those rules to a random (or selected) portion of the
civil docket,- 4 thereby imposing an element of serendipity, not
55
to mention fundamental unfairness on some litigants.
The separation-of-powers challenge to the Civil Justice Act
may be simply stated:
(1) Article III assigns judicial power to the United States
courts and this judicial power should be insulated from legislative or executive interference. The judicial power of the federal courts includes and has always included the power to
prescribe internal procedural rules for the conduct of litigation
in the federal courts. Procedural rulemaking is an inherent
power of the courts. In addition, Congress itself endorsed this
inherent power in the Rules Enabling Act, by statutorily conferring authority on the federal courts to promulgate procedural rules.
(2) In enacting the Civil Justice Reform Act, then, Congress impermissibly removed most, if not all of the essential attributes of rulemaking power from Article III judges and
vested that power in non-Article III adjuncts to the court. Further, Congress, in enacting the Civil Justice Reform Act, raised
district courts had implemented their plans by December 31, 1991. CIVIL Jussupra note 10, at 2.

TICE REFORM ACT REPORT,

53. See Mullenix, supra note 9, at 395-96 nn.84-85 (describing required and
recommended rules, measures, and programs of submitted plans). See generally CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT REPORT, supra note 10, exhibits C and D (status of alternative dispute resolution rules and differentiated case management
proposals in the reporting districts); id. app. I (summarizing rules, measures,

and programs of 34 reporting federal districts).
54. See, e.g., CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY GROUP OF THE U.S.
DIST. COURT FOR THE S. DIST. OF TEX., COST AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN
UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE ACT OF 1990, at 5 (1991) (provision for voluntary disclosure on experimental basis to be applied to a minimum of 10 cases for each
judge (20 in Houston) per year).
55. But see Linda J. Rusch, Separation of Powers Analysis as a Method
for Determining the Validity of Federal District Court's Exercise of Local
Rulemaking Power: Application to Local Rules Mandating Alternative Dispute Resolution, 23 CONN. L. REV. 483 (1991) (arguing generally that local
rulemaking authority does not violate separation-of-powers doctrine, and establishing a test to evaluate whether particular rules do violate separation of

powers).
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a danger that the Framers sought to avoid: that of the exercise
of unchecked power by one branch over another. In delegating
rulemaking power to civilian, non-expert advisory groups, and
in statutorily requiring that these advisory groups consider and
implement certain types of procedural reforms, Congress itself
engaged in procedural rulemaking. This congressional exercise
of a judicial function violates separation-of-power doctrine by
impermissibly infringing on the power, prerogatives, and independence of the federal courts to promulgate procedural rules.
(3) The basic theme of the constitutional scheme of government is that the institutional independence of the Judiciary
cannot be compromised by the actions of the other branches,
and the Constitution commands that the independence of the
judiciary be jealously guarded. The inherent powers of the
courts, once called into existence by Article III, include'the
powers of the judiciary to protect itself, to administer justice, to
promulgate rules for practice, and to provide process where
none exists. The Civil Justice Reform Act represents a rare example of Congress involving itself deeply in the internal operations of the federal judiciary, including an implementation
process controlled by forces other than the established decisionmakers within the federal court system.
2. Paradigmatic Separation-of-Powers Problems and the
Constitutional Validity of the Civil Justice Reform
Act
Separation-of-powers cases generally reflect three institutional conflicts among the branches. First, power struggles between the executive and legislative branches, which typically
have been grounded in national crises or foreign relations issues, have yielded landmark executive/legislative separation
cases. 56 Second, struggles between the executive and judicial
branches often have centered on the bounds of presidential prerogative, as dramatized in the struggle over the Nixon Watergate tapes.57 Both of these conflicts are often rooted in distinct
constitutional delineations of power, and thus seem doctrinally
56. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)
(addressing authority of the President to seize steel mills during the Korean
War and in time of economic crisis); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299
U.S. 304 (1936) (addressing authority of the President, based on congressional
delegation, to restrict arms sales to two warring countries); see also INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (addressing Congress's ability to use one-House
veto to overrule Attorney General's decision not to deport alien).
57. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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58

clear.

The third category of decisions centers on the tension between the legislative and judicial branches. These cases tend to
be more factually complicated and doctrinally elusive than
those involving the executive branch. 59 The Civil Justice Reform Act implicates this separation-of-powers scenario. Separa-

tion-of-powers cases centering on any of the three paradigmatic
models, however, offer problematic guidance for assessing the
Act's separation-of-powers problem. They do suggest, at least,
that a federal court construing the Act is likely to adopt a functionalist approach to the interbranch problem the Act's legislative delegation of judicial rulemaking authority raises.
a. Executive/Legislative SeparationProblems
The Supreme Court has used both the formalist and functionalist approaches in separation-of-powers cases involving disputes between the executive and legislative branches, but it is
virtually impossible to predict which analytical model the
Court will apply in any given case.60 The cases decided under
the formalist approach tend to concern easily defined problems,
thus giving rise to equally easily defined solutions. In contrast,
the cases decided using the functionalist approach tend to raise
fuzzier issues of inherent powers, and thus encourage courts to
apply balancing tests. Although neither set of paradigmatic
cases is especially useful for evaluating a separation-of-powers
challenge to the Civil Justice Reform Act, the functionalist
cases, especially those concerning inherent powers, provide a
better basis for analyzing the Civil Justice Reform Act.
Most of the core separation-of-powers cases involving executive/legislative disputes-Bowsher v. Synar,61 INS v. Chadha,6 2
and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 63-hew to the formalist model of constitutional interpretation and are usually
anchored in the express provisions of Articles I and I.6 When
58. But see Erwin Chemerinsky, ControllingInherent PresidentialPower:

Providing a Frameworkfor JudicialReview, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 863, 864-65
(1983) (suggesting inconsistency and vagueness in the Court's approach to "in-

herent" presidential power).
59. See, e.g., Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458
U.S. 50 (1982).
60. See Merrill, supra note 25, at 225-27.
61. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
62. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
63. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
64. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 727-34; Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944-59; Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 57-87; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120-43 (1976) (per curiam);
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Article II executive powers are clearly delineated, the Court
tends to render decisions that support a strong and unitary executive branch.6 When the Court, however, cannot find an express grant of executive branch power either in Article II, or,
as a delegated power, in Article I, the Court tends to favor Con66
gress's legislative authority.
The Court's formalist approach in executive/legislative
cases, relying on textual support for determining separation-ofpowers issues, supplies more in the way of rhetorical flourish
than analytical vigor.67 Although the Court can easily apply
the formalist approach to simple cases, such as those where it
can rely on specific constitutional provisions to resolve a chalYoungstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. 579, 585-89 (1952); Humphrey's Ex'r v.
United States, 295 U.S. 602, 626-32 (1935); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52,
108-76 (1926).
65. See, e.g., Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 721-34; see also Brown, supra note 24, at
1525-27 (noting that formalists also favor a strong executive branch through a
'unitary' theory of executive power).
66. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 585-89.
67. Typical of the Court's rhetoric in formalist cases are pronouncements
such as "[t]he Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers of the new
Federal Government into three defined categories, Legislative, Executive, and
Judicial." Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951. The Court in Chadha went on to note that
the Constitution not only separated the three branches of government, but
sought
to assure as nearly as possible, that each branch of government would
confine itself to its assigned responsibility. The hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power, even to accomplish desirable objectives, must be
resisted.
Although not "hermetically" sealed from one another, the powers
delegated in the three branches are functionally identifiable.
Id. (citations omitted).
The Court has also stated
[t]hat this system of division and separation of powers produces conflicts, confusion, and discordance at times is inherent, but it was deliberately so structured to assure full, vigorous, and open debate on the
great issues affecting the people and to provide avenues for the operation of checks on the exercise of governmental power.
Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 722. The Court in Bowsher not only relied heavily on the
Court's earlier formalist approach in Chadha, but also invoked Justice Sutherland's boilerplate statement in Humphrey's Executor.
The fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the three general
departments of government entirely free from the control or coercive
influence, direct or indirect, of either of the others, has often been
stressed and is hardly open to serious question. So much is implied in
the very fact of the separation of the powers of these departments by
the Constitution; and in the rule which recognizes their essential coequality.
Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 725 (quoting Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S.
602, 629-30 (1935)).
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lenged allocation of power, the analytical shallowness of the
formalist method fails to provide for interbranch disputes that
rely on assertions of implied or inherent powers. Obviously,
the rhetorical language that characterizes many executive/legislative separation cases fails to envision or encompass
interbranch problems involving the "boundary questions" of
the new administrative state,68 and what Justice Jackson called
the "zone of twilight" in which the President and Congress
may have concurrent authority.6 9 In disputes centered on theories of concurrent or inherent power, such as would be involved
in a challenge to the Civil Justice Reform Act, a federal court
therefore is more likely to resort to the flexible and pragmatic
functionalist approach. 70
In Nixon v. Administratorof General Services,71 the Court
applied such a functionalist approach to an executive/legislative
branch conflict. In Nixon, the executive branch claimed that
the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act7 2
unconstitutionally encroached upon the executive branch's inherent power to "control internal operations of the Presidential
office." 73 In rejecting this vague argument, the Court articulated the prototypical functionalist standard for determining
separation-of-powers issues:
[I]n determining whether the Act disrupts the proper balance between the coordinate branches, the proper inquiry focuses on the extent to which it prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its
constitutionally assigned functions. Only where the potential for disruption is present must we then determine whether that impact is
68. See Sargentich, supra note 24, at 444 (defining "boundary questions"
as "those concerning the constitutional status of an actor or action as legislative or executive," because "a principal element of doubt attaches to the nature of the boundary between the legislative and executive branches in the
particular circumstances").
69. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 58, at 869-70 (criticizing Justice Jackson's concurring opinion for not supplying analytical guidance for cases
involving inherent powers such as executive agreements, executive privilege,
impoundment, rescission of treaties, and removal of executive officials from
office).
70. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (upholding
President Carter's executive agreement with Iran against a separation-of-powers challenge that the Constitution did not authorize such agreements). Professor Brown argues that the Court used a functionalist approach in deciding
Dames & Moore but that it would have reached a different conclusion under
the formalist approach. See Brown, supra note 24, at 1527 n.55.
71. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
72. Pub. L. No. 93-526, 88 Stat. 1695 (1974) (current version at 44 U.S.C.
§ 2107 (1988)).
73. 433 U.S. at 439-40.
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justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress.74

In general, the executive/legislative separation-of-powers
cases decided under a formalist approach are not very helpful
in determining whether the Civil Justice Reform Act violates
separation-of-powers doctrine, because the Act does not transgress any delineated Article III power. Rather, the provisions
of the Civil Justice Reform Act represent a kind of "boundary
question" falling into Justice Jackson's "twilight zone" of separation-of-powers problems. The Civil Justice Reform Act entails the exercise of concurrent rulemaking authority by
Congress and the judiciary, and thus its constitutionality is better assessed in the context of a theory of shared powers.
b.

Executive/JudicialSeparationProblems

The paradigmatic separation-of-powers case involving a dispute between the executive and judicial branches, United States
v. Nixon,75 is instructive not for what it teaches about separation of powers, but rather for Chief Justice Burger's dissenting
opinion it inspired three years later in Nixon v. Administrator
of General Services.76 Indeed, United States v. Nixon, the famous Watergate tapes case, was hardly a separation-of-powers
case; the decision turned more on an alleged obstruction of
criminal process, 77 namely, the executive's refusal to respond to
a subpoena.
Nonetheless, in United States v. Nixon Justice Burger appeared to ground his argument in formalist terms, invoking
core Article III functions of the judiciary. Three years later in
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, however, Justice
Brennan curiously transformed Justice Burger's decision into
the archetypal functionalist approach to separation questions.
Although Chief Justice Burger arguably intended to ground the
Court's opinion in United States v. Nixon in a formalist inter74. Id. at 443 (citations omitted) (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683, 711-12 (1974)). Justice Brennan also agreed with the district court that
the President's argument rested on an "'archaic view of the separation of powers as requiring three airtight departments of government."' Id. (quoting
Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 408 F. Supp. 321, 342 (D.D.C. 1976)).
75. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
76. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
77. Chemerinsky, supra note 24, at 1083-84 (noting that United States v.
Nixon is the only separation-of-powers case in which the Burger Court voted
against the President). See generally Peter E. Quint, The Separation of Powers Under Nixon: Reflections on Constitutional Liberties and The Rule of
Law, 1981 DuKE L.J. 1, 31-34.
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pretation of the separation-of-powers doctrine, his opinion waffled hopelessly between the formalist and functionalist
perspectives. This ambiguous analysis opened the door for Justice Brennan's creative usurpation in the second Nixon case of
Burger's opinion in the first.
The conflict among the Nixon opinions, then, exposes the
philosophical tensions between the formalist and functionalist
approaches and the differing outcomes under each. Justice
Brennan's adaptation in the second Nixon case of Chief Justice
Burger's analysis in the first caused the Chief Justice to refine
his view of judicial independence, thus supplying concepts that
are useful for thinking about the Civil Justice Reform Act.
The first Nixon opinion is somewhat useful for further exegesis on separation-of-powers doctrine. Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Burger rejected President Nixon's
claim of an unqualified executive privilege against a subpoena
for tape recordings and documents.78 The Court rejected the
assertion that separation-of-powers doctrine itself precluded ju79
dicial review of the President's claim to executive privilege,
reaffirming the principle first enunciated in Marbury v.
Madison that federal courts were assigned the task of interpreting the laws and the Constitution, 0 even when that interpretation might vary from another branch's view.8 ' Using
formalist terms,8 2 the Chief Justice rejected the notion that the
78.

United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 703-13.

79. 1& at 703.
80. Id at 703-05; see also Chemerinsky, supra note 24, at 1094-96 (noting
the Burger Court's inconsistent approach to the availability of judicial review
in separation-of-powers cases depending on whether the separation challenge

was to executive or legislative action); Chemerinsky, supra note 58, at 895-900
(analyzing the availability of judicial review of inherent presidential power

claims).
81. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 703-04 (citing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962)).
82. Id at 707. The Chief Justice wrote: "The impediment that an absolute, unqualified privilege would place in the way of the primary constitutional
duty of the Judicial Branch to do justice in criminal prosecutions would

plainly conflict with the function of the courts under Art. III." I& As is true
for other portions of his opinion, Chief Justice Burger's basic formalist approach then slipped into a quintessentially functionalist perspective of interbranch relations: "In designing the structure of our Government and dividing
and allocating the sovereign power among three co-equal branches, the framers of the Constitution sought to provide a comprehensive system, but the separate powers were not intended to operate with absolute independence." I&

(citing Justice Jackson's concurring statement in Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952), regarding the interdependence of the
three branches).
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separation-of-powers doctrine could protect an unqualified
presidential immunity from judicial process under all circumstances.8 3 For Chief Justice Burger, to construe the Article II
powers as absolutely shielding the executive branch from criminal process was an interpretation that would "gravely impair
the role of the courts under Art. III."84
Had the Chief Justice stopped there, his opinion would
have followed the formalist approach strictly. Instead, Chief
Justice Burger offered a method to assess the degree of impairment to the respective branches caused by either overriding a
claim of executive privilege or contravening judicial process.8 5
In so doing, he opened the door for judges to balance competing
branch interests-an essentially functionalist approach to determining separation-of-powers questions8 6 Thus, although
Chief Justice Burger intended his opinion to reflect the formalist approach, he instead produced a functionalist statement of
87
interbranch relations.
This doctrinal confusion was not lost on Justice Brennan.
In the second Nixon case, involving a dispute between the executive and legislative branches over the control of Nixon's presidential papers, Justice Brennan capitalized on Chief Justice
Burger's earlier confused opinion to support the use of a balancing test.8 8 In response, Chief Justice Burger noted the
changed factual context and strongly protested Justice Brennan's use of his opinion in the Watergate tapes case to support a
functionalist rejection of executive branch control over presidential papers.8 9
Dissenting in the second Nixon case, Chief Justice Burger
attempted to articulate a firmer version of the formalist doctrine. He argued that separation-of-powers principles required
83. Id at 706-07.
84. Id at 707.
85. See id at 707-13. The Chief Justice stated: "Since we conclude that
the legitimate needs of the judicial process may outweigh Presidential privilege, it is necessary to resolve those competing interests in a manner that preserves the essential functions of each branch." Id at 707.
86. See id at 707-13. Chief Justice Burger formulated the balancing test,
in the context of the Watergate tapes dispute, as follows: "In this case we
must weigh the importance of the general privilege of confidentiality of Presidential communications in performance of the President's responsibilities
against the inroads of such a privilege on the fair administration of criminal
justice." Id at 711-12.
87. I& at 707-13.
88. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 429-84 (1977).
89. Id at 504-45 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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each branch "to be free from the coercive influence of the other
branches,"' 9 and that the Presidential Recordings and Material
Preservation Act was "an unprecedented departure from the
constitutional tradition of noncompulsion." 91 He was also disturbed that Justice Brennan's majority opinion had used a
functionalist approach 92 to convert "separation-of-powers principles into a simplistic rule which requires a 'potential for disruption' or an 'unduly disruptive' intrusion before a measure
will be held to trench on Presidential powers. '9 3 Moreover,
Chief Justice Burger believed that the Act violated the separation-of-powers doctrine "because it exercise[d] a coercive influence by another branch over the Presidency." 94 He argued that
the critical issue was not who had acted to seize control of the
papers (executive department employees), but rather who had
commanded those persons to act (Congress).9 5
Chief Justice Burger also believed that the Act violated the
separation-of-powers doctrine for another reason: it trenched
on the inherent executive branch power to control presidential
papers.6 This portion of his dissent is emblematic of his waf90.

Id, at 508-09 (citing Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602,

629-30 (1935); O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530 (1933); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923)). Ironically, Chief Justice Burger began his discussion of the problem with the blanket statement: "Separation of
powers is in no sense a formalism." Id at 507. Indicative of his analytical confusion, he then proceeded to discuss separation-of-powers doctrine in highly
formalist terms. See id at 507-18.
91. Id at 511. Chief Justice Burger noted: "The statute commands the
head of a legislatively created department to take and maintain custody of the
appellant's Presidential papers .

. . ."

Id. The same argument applies to the

Civil Justice Reform Act: the statute commands a legislatively created advisory group-albeit "appointed" by the district court-to recommend and promulgate new local procedural rules and measures. See supra notes 7-8 and
accompanying text.
92. 433 U.S. at 511-12 (noting that in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)
(per curiam), a unanimous Court had found a separation-of-powers violation
without any showing of "undue disruption").
93. I&
94. Id. at 514.
95. Id at 513. Chief Justice Burger stated:
Separation-of-powers principles are no less eroded simply because
Congress goes through a "minuet" of directing Executive Department
employees, rather than the Secretary of the Senate or the Doorkeeper
of the House, to possess and control Presidential papers. Whether
there has been a violation of separation-of-powers principles depends,
not on the identity of the custodians, but upon which branch has commanded the custodians to act. Here, Congress has given the
command.
Id96. Id. at 514-15. Chief Justice Burger argued that "[c]ontrol of Presiden-
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97
fling between analytical models.
Although the various majority and dissenting Nixon opinions muddle the differences between the formalist and functionalist approaches and often contradict one another, portions
of these decisions are particularly relevant to a separation-ofpowers challenge to the Civil Justice Reform Act. The first
Nixon decision supports the judiciary's right to interpret the
constitutionality of the Civil Justice Reform Act as a possible
incursion on third branch powers; indeed, it stands as an example of the Court upholding judicial review against a challenge
of another branch's prerogative. 98 In addition, Chief Justice
Burger's majority opinion recognized that core Article III functions may be impaired by competing branch exercises of power.
In the Watergate tapes case, that core Article III function was
the court's subpoena power, and the ability of court officers to
marshal evidence in a criminal prosecution.
More significant for construing the Civil Justice Reform
Act, however, may be Chief Justice Burger's analysis in the second Nixon case where he hardened his separation-of-powers
theory into familiar formalist terms of tripartite branches
"'limited to the exercise of the powers appropriate to [their]
own department and no other.' 99 Significantly, he also recognized the idea of implied, inherent powers.'0°
But perhaps Chief Justice Burger's most important insight
was reflected in his statement that separation-of-powers issues
should not be measured against who acted, but with reference
to who commanded those persons to act. 0 1 Applying this analysis to the Civil Justice Reform Act, Congress's delegation of
procedural rulemaking authority to third branch factotums
should render the Act constitutionally suspect. Under Chief
Justice Burger's non-compulsion view of the separation-of-powers doctrine, if the important issue is which branch commands
another to act, then arguably Congress has violated the separa-

tial papers is, obviously, a natural and necessary incident of the broad discretion vested in the President in order for him to discharge his duties." I& at
515. This passage is particularly emblematic of Justice Burger's waffling between the formalist and functionalist approaches.
97. See id at 514-16.
98. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
99. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. at 514 (quoting Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 191 (1880)).
100. Id. at 515.
101. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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tion-of-powers doctrine by creating advisory groups and commanding them to exercise procedural rulemaking authority.
c. Legislative/JudicialSeparationProblems
The cluster of cases involving separation-of-powers issues
between the legislative and judicial branches-Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. MarathonPipe Line Co.," ° 2 Commodity
°4
03
Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,1 Morrison v. Olson,1
and Mistretta v. United States' 5-share a common institutional
approach to the inquiry whether a particular congressional enactment has impermissibly violated Article III.106 These cases,
which are the closest analogues to that of the Civil Justice Reform Act, typically use a functional approach when assessing
challenges to Article III power.10 7 Only in Northern Pipeline
did the Supreme Court find that a congressional enactment violated the separation-of-powers doctrine by unreasonably invading Article III prerogatives. 0 8 Consequently, if provisions of
the Civil Justice Reform Act violate the separation-of-powers
doctrine, then it will be to the extent this legislation suffers
constitutional defects as severe as the Bankruptcy Act of
1978109 provisions invalidated in Northern Pipeline.
In Northern Pipeline, the Court held that Article III
barred Congress from establishing legislative courts to exercise
102. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
103. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
104. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
105. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
106. See Brown, supra note 24, at 1540-46 (discussing the Court's functionalist and institutionalist approach in Schor, Morrison, and Mistretta).
107. Professor Brown seeks to recast the Court's functionalist approach in
these cases as one truly grounded in a concern for due process. Thus, she
views Schor as a case illustrating '"ow principles of due process can work
their way into opinions addressing the constraints of article In," and the
Court's resolution of Morrison as presenting "a classic due-process concern:
the assurance of an impartial decisionmaker for the persons directly affected
by the statutory scheme." Id. at 1542-43.
108. See Mistretta,488 U.S. at 380-97 (upholding provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act against a separation-of-powers and impermissible delegation
challenge); Morrison, 487 U.S. at 677-85 (upholding the constitutionality of independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1976 against
an Article III separation-of-powers challenge); Schor, 478 U.S. at 847-58 (upholding the authority of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission to promulgate regulations under the Commodity Exchange Act and to exercise
jurisdiction over common law counterclaims).
109. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (current version at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1011330 (1988)).
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jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters. 10 It relied on two fundamental points: that the Constitution established an independent judicial branch,"' and that the delegation doctrine did not
support Congress's assignment of adjudicative functions to legislative courts. 1 2 Since the Civil Justice Reform Act's legitimacy is based in large part on permissible Article I delegation
doctrine, Northern Pipeline's analysis of that doctrine is especially significant.
The Court's opinion in NorthernPipeline employed a functionalist perspective. Justice Brennan's majority decision explained that tripartite government is maintained by a system of
checks and balances that serves "'as a self-executing safeguard
against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at
the expense of another.' "113 Thus, intrusion into third branch
prerogatives is a benchmark for unconstitutionality. Furthermore, the Court stated, the Framers intended an independent
judiciary that would serve as the bulwark of the checks and
balances system and guarantee an impartial adjudicatory
process.114
Although the Northern Pipeline Court tacitly acknowledged that the Framers constitutionally assigned Congress the
responsibility to decide the role of the lower federal courts, 115 it
explained that the right to create or eliminate lower federal
courts was itself circumscribed. 1 6 Thus, Justice Brennan
wrote that "the Framers did not leave it to Congress to define
the character of those courts-they were to be independent of
the political branches and presided over by judges with guaranteed salary and life tenure."" 17 Furthermore, Justice Brennan
reasoned that where Article III applies, all legislative powers
delineated in Article I are subject to it," 8 for any other conclusion would fail "to provide any real protection against the ero110. 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982) (holding that the original Bankruptcy Act of
1978 grant of jurisdiction to bankruptcy judges, Pub. L. No. 95-598, sec. 241(a),
§ 1471, 92 Stat. 2549, 2668 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 151-157, 1334 (1988))
violated Article III separation-of-powers doctrine).
111. See id at 57-76.
112. Id at 58-87.

113. Id. at 57-58.
114. Id. at 58 ("As an inseparable element of the constitutional system of

checks
defines
115.
116.
117.
118.

and balances, and as a guarantee of judicial impartiality, Art. III both
the power and protects the independence of the Judicial branch.").
Id at 64 n.15.
Id at 64-76.
I& at 64 n.15.
Id at 73.
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sion of Art. III jurisdiction by the unilateral action of the
political Branches."1 1 9 Thus, the first crucial analytical basis
for the Court's decision in Northern Pipeline was the protection of an independent judiciary against intrusion or interference from the political branches.
The Court's second basis for its decision was its rejection of
the suggestion that Congress's delegation power permitted it to
vest adjudicatory functions in non-Article III courts it created. 20 The Court distinguished permissible extensions of legislative power, such as the authority to create court adjuncts
such as magistrates and assign them adjudicatory functions, 21
from impermissible incursions into judicial power by explaining

that
when Congress creates a statutory right, it clearly has the discretion,
in defining that right, to create presumptions, or assign burdens of
proof, or prescribe remedies; it may also provide that persons seeking
to vindicate the right must do so before a particularized tribunal created to perform the specialized adjudicative tasks related to that right.
Such provisions do, in a sense, affect the exercise of judicial power,
but they are also incidental to Congress' power to define the right it
created. No comparative justification exists, however, when the right
being adjudicated is not of Congressional creation. In such a situation, substantial inroads into functions that have traditionallybeen
performed by the Judiciary cannot be characterizedmerely as incidental extensions of Congress' power to define rights it has created.
Rather, such inroads suggest unwarrantedencroachments upon the
United States, which our Constitution reserves
judicialpower of the
22
for Art. III courts-

Thus valid congressional actions do not violate the separationof-powers doctrine so long as they leave "'the essential attributes of the judicial power"' in the Article III courts,32 3 and link
Congress's assignment "to its legislative power to define substantive rights."' 24
Under this analysis, the Civil Justice Reform Act is consti119. Id. at 74; see also id at 73 ("The flaw in appellants' analysis is that it
provides no limiting principle. It thus threatens to supplant completely our
system of adjudication in independent Article III tribunals and replace it with
a system of 'specialized' legislative courts.").
120. Id. at 58-87.
121. Id. at 77 (discussing United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980) (upholding the Federal Magistrate's Act of 1978)).
122. Id. at 83-84 (emphasis added). Consistent with a functionalist perspective, Justice Brennan conceded, however, that "[d]rawing the line between
permissible extensions of legislative power and impermissible incursions into
judicial power is a delicate undertaking, for the powers of the Judicial and
Legislative Branches are often overlapping." Id. at 83 n.35.
123. Id. at 77 n.29 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932)).
124. Id.
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tutionally defective. The Act creates no substantive rights at
all. In the absence of such substantive content, Congress cannot extend its legislative powers so as to vest court adjuncts
with procedural rulemaking authority. Furthermore, under
Northern Pipeline, a congressional delegation of procedural
rulemaking authority such as that required by the Act represents a "substantial [inroad] into [a] function that [has] tradi' 5
tionally been performed by the Judiciary.' 2
The major cases involving legislative/judicial separation-ofpowers issues the Supreme Court has decided since Northern
Pipeline-Schor, Morrison, and Mistretta-have relied on
Northern Pipeline'sfunctionalist framework. The issue in each
case was whether the particular congressional enactment constituted an "encroachment" or "aggrandizement" by one branch
at the expense of the other and whether it impaired the judiciary's status as impartial and independent. 2 6 In each case, the
Court upheld the congressional delegation of authority as
neither unduly intruding on the province of the judiciary' 2 7 nor
compromising the judiciary's independent role as pervasively as
did the Bankruptcy Act of 1978.128
Of these cases, Mistretta clearly is the most important precedent for assessing a challenge to the constitutionality of the
Civil Justice Reform Act because the Sentencing Reform Act' 2 9
at issue in Mistrettapresents, in two major respects, the closest
statutory analog to the Civil Justice Reform Act. Similar to the
Civil Justice Reform Act's creation of the court-appointed advisory groups, the Sentencing Reform Act created the United
States Sentencing Commission, an independent body located in
the judicial branch. 130 In addition, Congress's delegation of au125. Id at 84.
126. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-74 (1989) (setting forth
functional framework for analysis); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 680, 683
(1988) (same); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833,
847-49 (1986) (same).
127. See supra note 108.
128. See, e.g., Mistretta,488 U.S. at 382 (citing Northern Pipeline as example of Court invalidation of congressional attempt to confer Article III power
on Article I judges); Schor, 478 U.S. at 852 (distinguishing the powers of the
CFTC from the overreaching powers delegated in the Bankruptcy Act
provisions).
129. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 35513625 (1988), and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988)).
130. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 368. The Commission was established "'as
an independent commission in the judicial branch of the United States"' consisting of seven voting members appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate. I& (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1988)). At least
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thority to the Sentencing Commission to promulgate sentencing
adviguidelines is similar to its delegation of authority to the 131
sory groups to promulgate procedural rules and measures.
The Mistretta Court rejected the challenge 132 that the Sentencing Reform Act constituted an impermissible delegation of
legislative power, 133 relying on the full rhetorical panoply of
functional analysis.1m After reviewing the role of the Sentencing Commission and the historical precedents for congressional
delegation of rulemaking authority to the judiciary, the Court
concluded that the Act did not violate the separation-of-powers
doctrine because "in placing the Commission in the Judicial
Branch, Congress cannot be said to have aggrandized the authree members are federal judges selected from a list recommended by the Judicial Conference; the Attorney General or his designate sits as an ex officio,
non-voting member. Id. Voting members hold six-year, staggered terms, and
may be removed by the President for neglect of duty, malfeasance, or good
cause. Id. See generally Ackerman, supra note 24, at 993 (providing analytical
framework for construing separation-of-powers challenges to various presidential commissions).
131. See Mistretta,488 U.S. at 369 (discussing the Sentencing Commission's
responsibility to review and revise sentencing guidelines).
132. Id. at 371-79. The commentary on Mistretta has been uniformly
highly critical. See Carter, ConstitutionalImproprieties,supra note 24, at 361,
402 (disapproving majority's holding in Mistretta); Liman, supra note 24
(deeming the Sentencing Commission to be constitutionally infirm and calling
for restructuring the Commission and eliminating binding effect of sentencing
guidelines); Dennis E. Curtis, Comment, Mistretta and Metaphor,66 S. CAL. L.
REV. 607 (1992) (discussing Mistretta and Professor Tushnet's analysis of the
merger of formalist and functionalist approaches); Mark Nielsen, Comment,
Mistretta v. United States and the Eroding Separationof Powers, 12 HARV. J.
L. & PUB. POL'Y 1049 (1989) (criticizing majority's decision as incomplete and
problematic); Kristin L. Timm, Note, "The Judge Would Then Be The Legislator" DismantlingSeparationof Powers in the Name of Sentencing Reform Mistretta v. United States, 65 WASH. L. REV. 249 (1990) (arguing Sentencing
Reform Act violates separation-of-powers principles in unconstitutionally expanding the powers of the legislature and impairing core functions of the judiciary); Fried, supra note 24 (discussing compromise of judicial independence
raised by Mistretta); Janis Hillman, Recent Development, 20 ST. MARY'S L.J.
1013 (1989) (criticizing Mistretta because of the likely piecemeal litigation over
the Guidelines' application in individual cases).
133. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371-79 (upholding Congress's delegation of authority to the Sentencing Commission as sufficiently specific and detailed to
withstand challenge of impermissible delegation); id. at 379-84 (upholding
placement of Sentencing Commission in the judicial branch and assignment of
rulemaking authority as not violative of separation-of-powers doctrine).
134. Id. at 381-83. The Court discussed the system of coordinate branches,
the need for a "pragmatic, flexible view of differentiated governmental
power," and the system of checks and balances. Id. at 381. Further, the Court
invoked the standards of aggrandizement of power, encroachment on prerogatives, as well as institutional integrity. Id. at 383.
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thority of that Branch or to have deprived the Executive
Branch of a power it once possessed.' 135 Moreover, the Court
held that Congress had not unconstitutionally delegated or diminished its authority. 136
At first blush, the Court's decision in Mistretta would appear to validate the Civil Justice Reform Act's delegation of
similar rulemaking authority. In reality, however, Mistretta is
an inapt precedent for determining the constitutionality of that
Act. Indeed, Mistretta's separation-of-powers problem is the
mirror-image of that presented by the Civil Justice Reform
Act.
In Mistretta,the Sentencing Reform Act was challenged as
an unconstitutional congressional delegation of substantive sentencing decisionmaking authority to the judicial branch. 137 Congress was accused of impermissibly delegating its substantive
legislative authority to an independent body located in the judicial branch. 138 The Civil Justice Reform Act, in contrast, raises
the issue of Congress's removal of procedural rulemaking authority from the third branch. Whatever finely-honed historical arguments the Mistretta majority marshals in support of the
power of congressionally-delegated substantive rulemaking authority, 3 9 the Court in Mistretta nowhere acknowledges the
central prohibitive feature of the Rules Enabling Act: that
Congress may enact substantive laws, but that the judicial
branch promulgates procedural rules.140 Thus, the failure of
135. Id at 395.
136. Id
137. Id at 371.
138. Id
139. Id. at 392-95.
140. The majority opinion instead even noted the weakness of its own argument based on the rulemaking analogy:
We agree with petitioner that the nature of the Commission's
rulemaking power is not strictly analogous to this Court's rulemaking
power under the enabling Acts. [sic] Although we are loathe to enter
the logical morass of distinguishing between substantive and procedural rules, and although we have recognized that the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure regulate matters "falling within the uncertain area
between substance and procedure, [and] are rationally capable of classification as either," we recognize that the task of promulgating rules
regulating practice and pleading before federal courts does not involve
the degree of political judgment integral to the Commission's formulation of sentencing guidelines.
Id. at 392 (citations omitted). The Court's admission that the Sentencing Commission was in effect making substantive rules involving a "degree of political
judgment" is important, because it distinguishes Mistretta's factual context
from the role of the advisory groups under the Civil Justice Reform Act,
where they are not.
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the Mistretta majority to recognize this distinguishes Mistretta
as problematic precedent for evaluating the legitimacy of the
Civil Justice Reform Act.
Justice Scalia, dissenting in Mistretta, recognized that the
nub of the separation issue turned on whether Congress was
delegating substantive law-making authority to the third
branch.1 4 1 In Justice Scalia's view, such congressional delegation is constitutional only when Congress vests the judiciary
with law-making authority that is ancillary to its exercise of judicial power-such as to adopt rules of procedure (his example). 142
For Justice Scalia, the law-making power of the
143
Sentencing Commission was "not ancillary but quite naked."'
Thus, the power that was vested in the Sentencing Commission
to create sentencing guidelines was a clear violation of separation-of-powers doctrine: "The only governmental power the
Commission possesses is the power to make law; and it is not

the Congress."' 144
Prophetically, Justice Scalia's criticism of the Mistretta majority opinion anticipated congressional enactment of the Civil
Justice Reform Act, the creation of the advisory groups within
the judiciary, and the delegation of procedural rulemaking authority to these bodies:
By reason of today's decision, I anticipate that Congress will find delegation of its lawmaking powers much more attractive in the future. If
rulemaking can be entirely unrelated to the exercise of judicial or executive powers, I foresee all manner of 'expert bodies,' insulated from
the political process, to which Congress will delegate various portions
14 5
of its lawmaking responsibility.

Justice Scalia also perceived the Mistretta decision would
lead to a consequence even more deleterious than that of substantive law-making delegations. Justice Scalia believed that
Mistretta would encourage Congress to delegate rulemaking au141.
142.

Id. at 422-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Ia at 425 (citing other examples).

143. Id- at 421.
144. Id, at 422.
145. Id. Carrying his point further, Justice Scalia suggested:
How tempting to create an expert Medical Commission (mostly

M.D.'s, with perhaps a few Ph.D.'s in moral philosophy) to dispose of
such thorny, "no-win" political issues as the withholding of life-sup-

port systems in federally funded hospitals, or the use of fetal tissue
for research. This is an undemocratic precedent that we set - not
because of the scope of the delegated power, but because its recipient
is not one of the three Branches of Government.
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thority it did not even possess, but that until Mistretta had been
within the true province of the judiciary:
If an "independent agency" such as this can be given the power to fix
sentences previously exercised by district courts, I must assume that a
similar agency can be given the powers to adopt rules of procedure
and rules of evidence previously exercised
by this Court. The bases
146

for distinction would be thin indeed.

The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, enacted one year after Mistretta,fulfills Justice Scalia's prophecy. The Act creates
Justice Scalia's feared "expert bodies"-the advisory groupslodged within the judiciary, and authorizes these groups to promulgate rules of federal civil procedure. As Justice Scalia suggested, these civilian advisory groups are indeed insulated from
the political process. Contrary to Justice Scalia's initial prediction, these advisory groups are not even exercising a substantive law-making function. In the Civil Justice Reform Act,
Congress has exceeded the permissible law-making delegation
legitimated in Mistretta, and stripped a core judicial function
traditionally assigned to the courts. In Mistretta, the Supreme
Court said that Congress did not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine by delegating substantive law-making authority to
an independent commission lodged in the third branch. 47 Mistretta did not say, however, that it was permissible for Congress
to strip the judiciary of one of its core functions-procedural
rulemaking-and lodge this in a congressionally created, politically insulated, independent body.

B. THE CIvIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT: THE ARGUMENT FOR A
SEPARATION-OF-POWERS VIOLATION

The Supreme Court's case law confirms the critical consensus that its separation-of-powers jurisprudence is inconsistent,
waffling between the formalist and functional views of constitutional government, sometimes even within a single decision.
The most important cases for construing the legality of the
Civil Justice Reform Act, those involving challenges to an independent judiciary, suggest that the Court favors a functional
resolution of such disputes. Yet they also demonstrate that the
Act is most likely to be sustained under a functional analysis,
while the view most likely hostile to this legislation-as embodied in Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Mistretta-proceeds
from a highly formalistic model.
146. Id at 425-26.
147. Id at 371.
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The essential difficulty in evaluating separation-of-powers
issues is the absence of a coherent methodology. 148 To fill this
analytical vacuum, Professor Erwin Chemerinsky suggests the
Court focus on three inquiries: whether one branch is exercising powers constitutionally committed to another; whether one
branch is preventing another from performing its functions or
duties; and whether one branch of government is acting in a
manner that prevents sufficient review or control by another.149 The first inquiry "requires the Court to analyze and
decide what powers are committed to which branches of government and under what circumstances a branch unconstitutionally assumes the power of another."'150 Under the second
inquiry, the Court must determine the functions of each branch
and what constitutes an impairment of these functions.' 5 1 The
third inquiry would have the Court "analyze the opportunities
for checks and review and determine what is a sufficient form
15 2
of control."'
Professor Chemerinsky's approach to separation-of-powers
cases offers a useful analytical framework that acknowledges
both formal and functional concerns. Eschewing originalism as
a legitimate basis for determining separation issues,15 3 his proposed approach has the same analytical power and authoritative
claim as Professor Redish's proposed model of "pragmatic for' 4
The primary rationale for this framework "is the
malism."'148.
149.
150.

Chemerinsky, supra note 24, at 1109.
Id at 1110-11.
Id- at 1110.

151. I&
152. I& at 1111.
153. Id- at 1105-09; see also id at 1098-1101 (discussing originalist and nonoriginalist approaches to separation-of-powers questions, and proponents and
critics); Redish & Cisar, supra note 24, at 494-97 (discussing and rejecting rigid
originalist methodology for separation-of-powers cases).
154. Redish & Cisar, supra note 24, at 454-55 (defining concept of "pragmatic formalism"); id at 474-78 (defending model of pragmatic formalism).
Redish and Cisar's model of pragmatic formalism eschews the balancing test
used in most functional approaches to separation-of-powers issues. Id. at 454.
Their "street-smart" mode of interpretation rejects "rigid, abstract interpretational formulas derived from an originalistic perspective." Id Instead of functional balancing, they would analyze the constitutionality of a branch's action
by "definitional analysis":
[T]he Court's role in separation of powers cases should be limited to
determining whether the challenged branch action falls within the
definition of that branch's constitutionally derived powers - executive, legislative, or judicial. If the answer is yes, the branch's action is
constitutional; if the answer is no, the action is unconstitutional. No
other questions are to be asked; no other countervailing factors are to
be considered.

1316

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:1283

relative inadequacy of every conceivable doctrinal alternative
as a means of ensuring the effectiveness of separation of
155
powers."
The Civil Justice Reform Act arguably violates the separation-of-powers doctrine in that Congress has impermissibly exercised procedural rulemaking authority constitutionally
committed to the judiciary by Article III; that Congress is interfering with federal courts' inherent power and impairing the
courts' ability to impartially adjudicate cases; and that Congress
has provided insufficient judicial control or review of this improper rulemaking delegation. It remains, therefore, to supply
content to each of Professor Chemerinsky's inquiries.
1.

Giving Content to Article III Powers

Article III's textual brevity, which provides little guidance
for Court literalists as to the proper extent of judicial authority,1 56 poses a distinct problem to courts deciding separation-ofpowers cases that involve the judiciary. Unlike Articles I and
II, which extensively delineate the powers of Congress and the
Presidency, Article III merely vests "judicial power" in the federal courts. 157 Other than providing for life tenure and prohibiting salary diminution, Article III does not indicate what
158
constitutes this judicial power.
Separation-of-power disputes relating to a definition of judicial power have instead centered on the Article III, section 2
"case or controversy" requirement. 59 These disputes typically
take two forms: instances where Congress has delegated nonId at 454-55. While the Redish-Cisar approach has the virtues of simplicity
and clarity, it nonetheless begs the question of defining branch power, which
in most separation cases is the nub of the dispute. This is especially true in
cases involving invocation of non-explicit, inherent branch powers.
155. Id. at 474.
156. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 24, at 1543, 1545; Redish & Cisar, supra

note 24, at 484.
157. Section 1 of Article III provides:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme
and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour,
and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation,
which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
158. See id; see also Alfange, supra note 24, at 684 (discussing the Framers'
concern for guaranteeing the personal independence of judges).

159. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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judicial functions to the judiciary, 60 and instances where Congress has attempted to modify the jurisdiction of the federal
courts. 161 With regard to the first category, although the Court

initially was reluctant to accept non-judicial functions, 62 it now
generally affirms congressional delegations of various rulemaking functions to the courts.163 Thus, the judicial power permits
delegations of legislative-like authority if it is ancillary to existing judicial powers. 164
With regard to congressional modification of federal court
jurisdiction, the legal bounds of propriety are equally fuzzy.
The relationship of Congress to the judiciary rests uneasily in
Article III's provision for "one supreme Court, and such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.' 65 Congress, therefore, can constitutionally deter160. See Alfange, supra note 24, at 680-81.
161. Id-at 681-94.
162. Id. at 680 (citing Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 352-56 (1911),
as supplying a brief history of federal court reluctance to accept non-judicial
functions).
163. Id-(citing Mistretta, Morrison, and Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat.) 1, 41-50 (1825), as examples of judicial acceptance of administrative
responsibilities).
164. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 417 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia's view is that Congress can determine the extent of
delegated law-making, but the Court will approve such delegations only when
the law-making authority is ancillary to existing exercises of judicial power.
See icd(citing Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 22 (1941) (power to adopt
rules of procedure); Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S.
1 (1911) (power to define what constitutes a "restraint of trade"); Wayman v.
Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 45 (1825) (power to prescribe method in which
officers execute judgments)).
165. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. There is a significant line of decisions dealing
with problems of the scope of Article III case-and-controversy judicial power,
which Justice Brennan attempted to categorize in Northern Pipeline. See
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 63-76
(1982) (discussing judicial power in terms of the types of cases and controversies the Framers assigned to an independent Article III branch, and the three
situations where Article III does not bar creation of legislative courts or delegations to administrative agencies). Justice Brennan's attempt to analytically
unify Article III judicial power in terms of the case-or-controversy requirement was largely unsuccessful, and criticized by the dissenters in that case,
and shifting coalitions of Justices in subsequent separation cases. See Alfange,
supra note 24, at 687-94 (discussing Justice Brennan's analytical model and its
criticism by the dissenters and in subsequent cases).
These cases typically involve an issue concerning congressional delegation
to a legislative court or administrative agency that allegedly transgresses the
scope of Article III jurisdiction by conferring judicial powers on persons lacking Article III independence. See Northern Pipeline,458 U.S. at 64-70. These
cases provide problematic analogies for construing the Civil Justice Reform
Act, which does not create a legislative court nor delegate power to an admin-
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mine the size and structure of the federal court system, 166 and
this congressional power conventionally has been interpreted to
include the authority to determine the jurisdiction of the lower
federal courts.167 That Congress can withdraw entire categories
of federal jurisdiction is also a well-established tenet of constitutional law. 168 Article III, however, does not expressly limit
congressional power over judicial jurisdiction.
United States v. Klein, which arose from the Civil War
presidential pardons, 169 is the key separation-of-powers decision
that limits Congress's power over federal jurisdiction. The
Klein Court struck down an 1870 congressional proviso that essentially prescribed the judicial effect to be given to executive
pardons or declarations of amnesty. 170

The Court concluded

that Congress may not enact a substantive rule of decision that
alters original federal court jurisdiction already conferred in a
pending case;' 7 ' to do so would breach the separation-of-powers
doctrine by rendering vulnerable the institutional independence of the courts. 172 The central problem with Congress's
enactment was that it did not withdraw jurisdiction over an encases
tire category of cases, but rather only over particular
17 s
outcome.
unfavorable
an
anticipated
Congress
where
A broad reading of Klein suggests a separation-of-powers
violation where Congress, without repealing or amending the
underlying statute, withdraws federal court jurisdiction in an
attempt to affect the outcome of a pending case.174 During the
istrative agency. The closest analog to the Civil Justice Reform Act advisory
groups is the United States Sentencing Commission created by the Sentencing
Reform Act. See supra notes 130-46.

166. Alfange, supra note 24, at 681.
167. See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 448-49 (1850); Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 331-33 (1816).
168. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868) (upholding
statute excluding Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over habeas corpus
cases).
169. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871). See generally
PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 368-69 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER];
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 50-51 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing Klein).
170. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 147.
173. See Alfange, supra note 24, at 683.
174. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 169, at 27 (Supp. 1992) (commenting on Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 914 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that subsections of the Northwest Timber Compromise violate the
separation-of-powers doctrine under a broad reading of Klein)). The Supreme
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legislative hearings on the Civil Justice Reform Act, the judges
and the American Bar Association representative who appeared
before the Senate Judiciary subcommittee cited Klein as the
major doctrinal support for their proposition that the Act
presented separation-of-powers problems as an unusual incursion on third branch power. 175
Klein, however, offers only an oblique challenge to the
Civil Justice Reform Act's legitimacy. Although the Act does
affect pending and future litigation in the sense that it withdraws from federal courts their authority over procedural
rulemaking, it does not literally supply any substantive rules
that anticipate or would reverse a disfavored outcome in pending litigation. Rather, Klein is important because it articulates
a principled limit on congressional interference with judicial
power, thus demonstrating that congressional action may indeed constitute an assault on the courts' institutional independence. Congress's wholesale withdrawal from the courts of
control over their own internal procedure in the Civil Justice
Reform Act is arguably a greater congressional compromise of
judicial independence than that at issue in Klein.
2. The Inherent Powers of the Courts
One will have difficulty grounding a separation-of-powers
argument against the Civil Justice Reform Act on an explicit
assignment of judicial power in Article III. Article III does not
speak to the federal courts' rulemaking authority, and the cases
dealing with congressional delegations of power and modification of federal court jurisdiction are largely unavailing in
resolving the issue of the Act's legitimacy. 7 6 The Act deals
with neither the substantive jurisdiction of the federal courts
nor a delegation of substantive authority to a legislative court
or an administrative agency. Rather, it involves the converse
problem of Congress removing a power from the judicial
branch and then improperly delegating it to a non-judicial body
lodged within the judicial branch.
Although the Civil Justice Reform Act does not implicate
an incursion into explicit judicial authority, it raises the issue of
Court refused to review the scope of Klein on appeal, because the Court held
that Congress had amended the underlying statute. Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 112 S. Ct. 1407, 1414 (1992).
175. For a general overview of commentary critical of the bill given in congressional hearings, see Mullenix, supra note 9, at 411-24.
176. See supra note 165 (discussing relevant cases).
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interference with functions that are a part of the judiciary's
"inherent power." Any constitutional challenge to the Act
must rest on the theory that Article III judicial powers include
inherent, non-explicit powers that Congress has taken from the
judiciary in violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine.
While the existence of inherent executive power is well established, 177 that of inherent judicial power is much less so. Nonetheless, a doctrine of inherent judicial power exists, and courts
have made recourse to it when deciding separation-of-powers
78
cases.
The Supreme Court has defined judicial "inherent powers"
as those necessary for a court to function. 179 The theory posits
177. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304,
318-19 (1936) (stating that the unenumerated power of the federal government
over foreign affairs rests principally with the President). See generally
Chemerinsky, supra note 58, at 867-80 (reviewing cases and discussing critical
commentary).
Commentators have debated the scope of these powers. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 58, at 910 (asserting that the Supreme Court's ad hoc, unprincipled approach to inherent presidential power has contributed to the
creation of an "Imperial Presidency"); Redish & Cisar, supra note 24, at 483-85
(rejecting theory of inherent executive power based on language of vestiture
clause).
178. See Young v. United States ex rel Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787,
795-96 (1987) (federal courts possess inherent authority to initiate contempt
proceedings for disobedience of their orders, and holding that "[c]ourts cannot
be at the mercy of another Branch in deciding whether such proceedings
should be initiated"); see also Michael M. Martin, Inherent JudicialPower:
Flexibility Congress Did Not Write into FederalRules of Evidence, 57 TEX. L.
REV. 167, 181-87 (1979) (describing doctrine of inherent court power, especially
with reference to ability to prescribe rules of evidence); James S. DeGraw,
Note, Rule 53, Inherent Powers, and InstitutionalReform: The Lack of Limits
on Special Masters, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 800 (1991) (recognizing the use of inherent judicial powers to appoint adjunct special-masters); Hugh M. Favor, Jr.,
Comment, Federal Courts Sanctioning Represented Parties Using Rule 11 and
Their Inherent Powers: You Can Run But You Cannot Hide, 21 CAP. U. L.
REV. 225, 244-53 (1992) (discussing cases affirming the inherent power to sanction litigants and parties). But see Stephen B. Burbank, Sanctions in the Proposed Amendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure: Some Questions
About Power, 11 HOFsTRA L. REv. 997, 1005 (1983) (citing Roadway Express,
Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980), for the proposition that inherent powers
should be exercised with restraint because they are shielded from direct democratic control).
179. See Young, 481 U.S. at 819-20 (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing and
limiting the scope of Hudson's dicta on inherent court powers); United States
v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (holding that criminal jurisdiction
over common-law crimes requires statutory authorization because it is not
within implied judicial power). In Hudson, however, the Supreme Court observed broadly:
Certain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature of their institution ....

To fine for contempt -
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that once Congress creates federal courts and vests them with
jurisdiction, it must also vest them with those powers necessary
for them to administer justice 18 0 and to preserve their status as
part of an independent branch. 18 1 Federal courts have thus recognized a variety of powers as inherent, including the power to
regulate the practice of law,18 2 to control their own proceedings
and dockets, 8 3 to protect themselves through contempt orders
from abuse or insult,184 to impose sanctions on litigants, L8 5 to
provide for process where none exists, 18 6 and to promulgate
187
rules of practice.
imprison for contumacy -

inforce [sic] the observance of order, &c.

are powers which cannot be dispensed with in a Court, because they
are necessary to the exercise of all others: and so far our Courts no
doubt possess powers not immediately derived from statute.
Id.
180. A. Leo Levin & Anthony G. Amsterdam, Legislative Control over Judicial Rule Making: A Problem in ConstitutionalRevision, 107 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 30 (1958).
181. See United States v. Brainer, 515 F. Supp. 627, 631-35 (D. Md. 1981)
(discussing cases and authorities stressing the value of an independent judiciary entailed in inherent power cases), rev'd, 691 F.2d 691 (4th Cir. 1982).
182. Id. at 633 (citing Attorney Gen. of Maryland v. Waldron, 426 A.2d 929,
934 (Md. 1981)).
183. See Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936); United States v.
Correia, 531 F.2d 1095, 1098 (1st Cir. 1976); United States v. Inman, 483 F.2d
738, 740 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam), cert denied, 416 U.S. 988 (1974).
184. See Young v. United States ex rel Vuitton et Fills S.A., 481 U.S. 787,
795-96 (1987); Michaelson v. United States ex rel Chicago, St. P., M., & 0. Ry.,
266 U.S. 42, 65-66 (1924); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418,
450 (1911); Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1874); Anderson v.
Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227 (1821). See generally Felix Frankfurter &
James M. Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts
in "Inferior"Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARv. L.
REv. 1010 (1924) (finding no constitutional impediment when Congress confers
contempt powers to courts).
185. See, e.g., Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2133-35 (1991) (federal courts possess inherent power to issue attorney fee sanctions apart from
statutory or Rule 11 basis). For discussions of the Court's reliance on an inherent powers theory, see generally Rebecca G. Moore, Chambers v. Nasco,
Inc.-Judicial Discipline Wields a Big Stick, 37 LoY. L. REV. 1043 (1992);
Bryan P. Vezey, A Federal CourtHas Inherent Power To Assess Attorney Fees
as a Sanction for Bad-Faith Conduct, and in a Diversity Case May Employ
that Power Without Regard to the Law of the Forum State: Chambers v.
Nasco, 33 S. TEX. L. REV. 647 (1992); Goodloe Partee, Note, 14 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L.J. 107 (1991).
186. Brainer,515 F. Supp. at 633 (quoting Attorney Gen. of Maryland v.
Waldron, 426 A.2d 929, 934 (Md. 1981) (quoting State v. Cannon, 221 N.W. 603,
603-04 (Wis. 1928) (quoting In re Bruen, 172 P. 1152, 1153 (Wash. 1918)))).
187. Heckers v. Fowler, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 123, 128 (1864); Winberry v. Salisbury, 74 A.2d 406, 408-09 (N.J.), cert denied, 340 U.S. 877 (1950); see also RoB
ERT E. RODES ET AL., SANCTIONS ImpOSABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE FEDERAL
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The unifying theme of these inherent judicial powers,
which generally provide for administrative autonomy, is their
necessity for the maintenance of judicial independence. In separation-of-powers terms, this dictates that the legislative branch
not exercise control over the administration of judicial functions.:"" Thus, some inherent judicial powers are so fundamental that to divest the courts of them "is to make meaningless
the very phrase judicial power." 189
The power to prescribe adjective law is just such an inherent judicial power. Although Congress legitimately possesses a
constitutional and statutory role in rulemaking, the theory of
inherent court power nonetheless requires that congressional
involvement in rulemaking acknowledge the "significance of a
certain degree of judicial autonomy" over internal court rules
of practice and procedure. 190 Thus, pursuant to the rulemaking
allocation set forth in the Rules Enabling Act, "[t]he Congressional rulemaking power is validly exercised in such a way as to
avoid undue interference with the execution of judicial power,
thereby preserving the integrity of the doctrine of separation of
powers."'191
Thus, by delegating procedural rulemaking authority to a
non-Article III advisory group lodged within the judicial
branch, Congress has transgressed the Rules Enabling Act, intruded on the inherent power of the judiciary in its rulemaking
function, and violated the separation-of-powers doctrine.
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 181 n.473 (1981); Judith Resnik, Managerial

Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 396 n.80 (1982). But see Burbank, supra note
178, at 1004 n.30 (refuting proposition that Heckers supports inherent rulemaking power in the federal courts).
The Winberry decision has engendered a substantial body of critical commentary disputing this claimed inherent power. CompareBenjamin Kaplan &
Warren J. Greene, The Legislature'sRelation to JudicialRulemaking: An Appraisal of Winberry v. Salisbury, 65 HARv. L. REV. 234 (1951) (critical of
court's decision) with Roscoe Pound, Procedure Under Rules of Court in New
Jersey, 66 HARv. L. REv. 28, 37 (1952) (favorable to notion of inherent court
rulemaking authority as supportive of judicial administration function).
188. See Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 180, at 31-32 (context of state legislative and judicial relations).
189. See id. at 30.
190. Brainer,515 F. Supp. at 634.
191.

Id.
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II. THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT AND THE RULES
ENABLING ACT
A. THE ALLOCATION OF POWER EMBODIED IN THE RULES
ENABLING ACT

1. The Doctrinal and Historical Basis of the
Substance/Procedure Distinction
The first section of the Rules Enabling Act provides that
"[t]he Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general
rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases
in the United States district courts (including proceedings
before magistrates thereof) and courts of appeals."1 92 The Act
does not represent, however, Congress's first delegation of rule
promulgation power to the courts. The Act was merely the
codification at the federal level of a long series of statutory
193
delegations of procedural rulemaking authority to the courts,
both here and in Britain.
British courts traditionally have possessed rulemaking authority.1 94 Nineteenth-century British legal reforms anticipated the shared legislative/judicial rulemaking authority that
192. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1988). Before it was amended in 1988, the Rules
Enabling Act had provided in part:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general
rules, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the
practice and procedure of the district courts and courts of appeals of
the United States in civil actions, including admiralty and maritime
cases, and appeals therein, and the practice and procedure in proceedings for the review by the courts of appeals of decisions of the Tax
Court of the United States and for the judicial review or enforcement
of orders of administrative agencies, boards, commissions, and officers.
28 U.S.C.A. § 2072 (West 1982) (repealed 1988).
193.

See JACK B. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCE-

DURES 55-63 (1977) (providing a historical overview of legislative rulemaking
authority); Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 180, at 3-5; see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 2071 (1988) (providing rulemaking authority for local rules of court). See
generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 1015 (1982) (providing history of the Rules Enabling Act); Albert B.
Maris, Federal ProceduralRule-Making: The Program of the JudicialConference, 47 A.B.A. J. 772 (1961) (discussing the history of judicial rule-making and
the activities of the Judicial Conference); The Rule-Making Function and The
Judicial Conference of the United States, 21 F.R.D. 117 (1957) (statements of
various judges addressing congressional proposal to authorize Judicial Conference to make recommendations for revisions to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure).
194. "Before the nineteenth century each court regulated its own internal
procedure with very little intervention by Parliament." R. WALKER & M.
WALKER, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 60 (2d ed. 1970), quoted in WEINSTEIN,

supra note 193, at 25.
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the American Rules Enabling Act embodies. Between 1825 and
1875, Parliament took the lead in judicial reform by enacting a
series of acts affecting rulemaking, the most significant of
which were the Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875.195
In America, the tradition of judicial procedural rulemaking
began in the era of the Framers, and extends throughout
American history. 196 During the colonial period the separation
of judicial and legislative functions was "imperfect," but nonetheless most colonial courts modified practice and procedure
"on a case-by-case basis without legislative intervention."'19
During the constitutional period, and especially in the Federalist Papers,the value of an independent judiciary emerged, but
the federalist debates are unilluminating on the problem of the
allocation of rulemaking authority in separation-of-powers
terms. 198 Once the Constitution was ratified, Congress empowered the federal courts to adopt rules for practice and procedure. Thus, section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 stated that
the Circuit courts, as well as other federal courts, had the authority "to make and establish all necessary rules for the orderly conducting business in the said courts, provided such
rules are not repugnant to the laws of the United States."'199
Similarly, through the Process Acts of 1789 and 1792, Congress gave rulemaking authority to the Supreme Court in proceedings at common law, 200 equity, and admiralty.201 The scope
195.

Id.

WEINSTEIN, supra note 193, at 25. As Judge Weinstein has described:

What evolved was a cooperative scheme for rule-making with legislative control over the overall procedural design and with authority
over the details left to the courts. The Civil Procedure Act of 1833,
for example, placed power in the courts to formulate procedural
rules, which led to the Hilary Rules of 1834. Section 17 of the Judicature Act of 1875 authorized the judges of the Supreme Court to make
rules governing procedure, and together with subsequent acts, vested
this power in a committee of judges.

196. Id at 36-44 (reviewing the debates at the constitutional convention relating to an independent judiciary, and the state ratification debates, THE FEDERALIST Nos. 75-82 (Alexander Hamilton)). Judge Weinstein makes the
interesting argument that the ban on advisory opinions also might vitiate judicial rulemaking authority because rulemaking authority represents a similar
infringement on legislative power. Id, at 44-55. He concludes, however, only
that "[i]n the end the question of whether the legislature or the courts or both
should possess the rule-making power comes down to a policy question where
a series of arguments ... must be weighed and balanced." Id- at 54.
197.

Id.

198. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 75-82 (Alexander Hamilton).
199. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 73, 83.
200. Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93.
201. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276.
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of this authority was "subject... to such alterations and additions as the [federal] courts respectively shall in their discretion
deem expedient, or to such regulations as the supreme court of
the United States shall think proper from time to time by rule
to prescribe to any circuit or district court concerning the
same." 20 2 In 1793, Congress reconsidered the Process Act and
placed rulemaking power in the "several Courts of the United
States" and supplemented greatly the original rulemaking provisions of section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the Process Act of 1792.203
Congress "sweepingly reaffirmed" 20 4 the power of federal
courts to promulgate rules of practice and procedure in 1842.205
The judicial rulemaking authority recognized in this statute
again demonstrates that, for more than two-hundred years,
of the
Congress has long acceded to the practical authority
20 6
courts to formulate their own procedural rules.

202. Id
203. Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 7, 1 Stat. 333, 335. In this enhanced version of rulemaking delegation, the Act provided:
it shall be lawful for the several courts of the United States, from
time to time, as occasion may require, to make rules and orders for
their respective courts directing the returning of writs and processes,
the filing of declarations and other pleadings, the taking of rules, the
entering and making up judgments by default, and other matters in
the vacation and otherwise in a manner not repugnant to the laws of
the United States, to regulate the practice of the said courts respectively, as shall be fit and necessary for the advancement of justice,
and especially to that end to prevent delays in proceedings.
I&L Judge Weinstein observes:
The 1793 law continued the tendency of the 1792 Process Act to relax
legislative control over rule-making and to expand the court's powers
in that area. Although Congress retained the power to intervene to
formulate rules of practice and procedure, as indicated by the phrase
requiring the rules to be 'in a manner not repugnant to the laws of
the United States,' the practical authority to formulate rules shifted
to the courts."
WEINSTEIN, supra note 193, at 60 (quoting § 7, 1 Stat. at 335).
204.

WEINSTEIN, supra note 193, at 60.

205. Act of Aug. 23, 1842, ch. 188, § 6, 5 Stat. 516, 518.
206. Thus, the 1842 statute provided that:
the Supreme Court shall have full power and authority, from time to
time, to prescribe and regulate, and alter, the forms of writs and other
process to be used and issued in the district and circuit courts of the
United States, and the forms and modes of framing and filing libels,
bills, answers, and other proceedings and pleadings, in suits at common law or in admiralty and in equity pending in the said courts, and
also the forms and modes of taking and obtaining evidence, and of obtaining discovery, and generally the forms and modes of proceeding to
obtain relief, and the forms and modes of drawing up, entering, and
enrolling decrees, and the forms and modes of proceeding before
trustees appointed by the court, and generally to regulate the whole
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During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the development of an independent federal procedure was hampered by
other provisions of the Process Acts of 1789 and 1792,207 and the
Conformity Act of 1872, which required federal courts to follow
state procedures in actions at law. 20 8 The undesirability of this
arrangement ultimately led to the twentieth-century reform
movement for a uniform set of federal procedural rules, which
culminated in the enactment of the Rules Enabling Act in
1934.209 Thus a long history vesting procedural rulemaking authority in the courts culminated in the Rules Enabling Act's
designation of procedural rulemaking authority in judges. As
Professor Paul Carrington has noted, it was the British Parliament that first embraced the idea of transferring responsibility
for civil procedure to the judges themselves, and the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 is really "an imitation of the English Judicature Act of 1875" that had been imitated already by many
210
states.
Thus, the Senate Judiciary subcommittee's claim in the
legislative history to the Civil Justice Reform Act that Congress has exclusive rulemaking power2 1 1 is nonsense. This assertion blatantly ignores the British historical antecedents to
American procedural reform, the federalists' concern with ensuring institutionally the existence of an independent judiciary,
and over two hundred years of practical experience with judicial rulemaking. Our constitutional history demonstrates that
from the earliest days of the republic, while Congress has exercised consistently its legislative authority under Article III to
constitute the inferior federal courts, and to confer on them
procedural rulemaking authority, it has not engaged in procedural rulemaking itself and can hardly lay claim to an exclusive
constitutional claim to do so. Indeed, aside from only two
practice of said courts, so as to prevent delays, and to promote brevity
and succinctness in all pleadings and proceedings therein, and to abolish all unnecessary costs and expenses in any suit therein.
Id.
207. See supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
208. Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, §§ 5, 6, 17 Stat. 196, 197; see WEINSTEIN,
supranote 193, at 64-66. It is important to keep in mind that even though federal courts were required to follow state procedural rules, those rules were
themselves the product of judicially promulgated, rather than legislatively
promulgated, rulemaking authority.
209. WEINSTEIN, supra note 193, at 66-69.
210. Paul D. Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure"in the Rules EnablingAct, 1989 DuKE L.J. 281, 301.
211. S. REP. No. 416, supra note 7, at 9-12, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 6811-15; see also Mullenix, supra note 9, at 424-32.
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anomalous, unfortunate exceptions in the last decade, 2' 2 Congress has never exercised its so-called exclusive rulemaking
power. Only in the Civil Justice Reform Act has Congress attempted to create and invoke this exclusive power.
Yet the notion that Congress has the authority to establish
rules of procedure is commonly accepted. 213 This blanket assertion, asserted most recently by Congress in the legislative
history to the Civil Justice Reform Act,2 14 is the unfortunate

consequence of rote repetition, by advocates of congressional
rulemaking authority, of dicta in two Supreme Court cases construing the Rules Enabling Act-Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. 21 5
216
and Hannav. Plumer.
The selective use of two sentences of dicta from Sibbach
and Hanna to support Congress's claim of exclusive rulemaking
authority, however, ignores the significance of the entire line of
cases construing the second provision of the Rules Enabling Act
212. See Mullenix, supra note 18, at 844-48 (discussing congressional revisions to FED. R. Civ. P. 4 and 35); see also Carrington, supra note 210, at 320

(suggesting that Congress's 1982 adoption of Rule 4 as a statute eliminated any
separation-of-powers problem).
213. This wisdom is found in constitutional law treatises. See, e.g., TRIBE,
supra note 169, at 50 (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1965), for
the proposition that "[clonsistent with constitutional limitations, Congress
clearly has authority to fix the rules of procedure, including the rules of evidence, which article HI courts must apply"). It is also found in standard commentary on the rulemaking process. See, e.g., WEINSTEIN, supra note 193, at 90
(citing Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941), for the proposition that
"Congress's position as possessor and delegator of the rule-making power is
now assumed without question by the courts"). For a discussion of the roots of
this misconception, see infra notes 215-16.
214. See Mullenix, supra note 9, at 424-32 (discussing Senate legislative history to the Civil Justice Reform Act).
215. 312 U.S. 1 (1941). In Sibbach, the Court declared that: "Congress has
undoubted power to regulate the practice and procedure of federal courts, and
may exercise that power by delegating to this or other federal courts authority
to make rules not inconsistent with the statutes or constitution of the United
States ...." Id at 9-10 (footnote omitted). This famous declaration has been

quoted routinely by subsequent courts. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 361, 387 (1989); see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 400, 471-72 (1965)
(relying on Sibbach dictum).
216. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). In Hanna, the Court made a pronouncement similar to that in Sibbach:
[Tihe constitutional provision for a federal court system (augmented
by the Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with it congressional
power to make rules governing the practice and pleadings in those
courts, which in turn includes a power to regulate matters which,
though falling within the uncertain area between substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either.
Id at 472. Proponents of congressional authority also invoke the pronouncement. See, e.g., Mistretta,488 U.S. at 387-88.
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that "[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. '2 17 These cases center on the inquiry whether a
particular Court-promulgated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
has violated that prohibition.2 1 8 If the Court in fashioning a
rule alters substantive rights by promulgating rules of general
effect, it is engaged in unconstitutional lawmaking. This provision of the Rules Enabling Act codified the repeated provision
in predecessor statutes that prohibited courts from promulgating any procedural rules that "were repugnant to the laws of
the United States. ' 219 Thus, the Sibbach line of cases demonstrates only judicial efforts to clarify the distinction between
substantive law and procedural rules. The body of decisional
law beginning with Sibbach reflects a fifty-year judicial effort
to clarify a meaningful distinction between substantive law and
procedural rules, accompanied by a large body of academic disputation pointing out the difficulty and futility of that
22 0
exercise.
Since the enactment of the Rules Enabling Act, the Court
has never once found a Court-promulgated rule to transgress
the Enabling Act's prohibition against the exercise of substan217. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1988). Before it was amended in 1988, the Act
provided: "Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right and shall preserve the right of trial by jury as at common law and as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution." 28 U.S.C.A. § 2072
(West 1982) (repealed 1988).
218. See Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., 111 S.
Ct. 922, 933-35 (1991) (Rule 11); Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 162-63 (1973)
(Rule 48); Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464-65 (Rule 4(d)(1)); Schlagenhauf v. Holder,
379 U.S. 104, 112-14 (1964) (Rule 35(a)); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351
U.S. 427, 433-35 (1956) (Rule 54(b)); Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree,
326 U.S. 438, 445 (1946) (Rule 4 (f)); Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14 (Rule 35).
The possibility of a Rules Enabling Act violation has arisen in other contexts, but has not formed the basis for the Court's decision. For further discussion of the extent of the Rules Enabling Act, see, for example, Mistretta,
488 U.S. at 384-97 (discussing location of U.S. Sentencing Commission in the
judicial branch as not violating the Rules Enabling Act); Stewart Org., Inc. v.
Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 27 (1988) (discussing § 1404(a) transfer statute);
Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1, 36 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing
Rule 68); Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 543-44 (1984) (Stevens,
J., concurring) (discussing Rule 23.1); Miner v. Atlass, 363 U.S. 641, 654-55
(1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing admiralty rules of procedure, in
light of Sibbach).
219. See Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 7, 1 Stat. 333, 335.
220. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Hold the Corks: A Comment on Paul
Carrington's "Substance" and "Procedure"in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989
DUKE L.J. 1012; Burbank, supra note 178, at 1006-07; Carrington, supra note
210.
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tive lawmaking authority.221 Indeed, the Rules Enabling Act
cases do not at all deal with the fundamental separation-ofpowers issue implicit in every challenge to a Court-promulgated
rule. Except for the dicta in Sibbach and Hanna, these cases
have not addressed the constitutional allocation of rulemaking
authority. Rather, they typically have been preoccupied solely
with locating where along a fuzzy substance/procedure continuum a particular judicial exercise of rulemaking authority
fits. 222 Thus, a constitutional challenge to the Civil Justice Reform Act cannot be resolved by recourse to the Sibbach line of
cases, because each decision has been accomplished with reference to a judicial interpretation of the substance/procedure distinction embodied in the second provision of the Rules
Enabling Act.
The Civil Justice Reform Act presents a challenge to the
Rules Enabling Act's vesting of procedural rulemaking in the
Supreme Court, 223 and its pre-1988 provision vesting a supervisory review role in the Congress. 224 These provisions embodied
the constitutional separation-of-powers limitations on the respective allocation of rulemaking authority. As Professor Carrington has suggested, the first provision of the Rules Enabling
Act was "a delegation of some federal law-making power created by Article III, which authorizes Congress to establish
lower federal courts." 225 The Act's second provision, in this
view, was unnecessary, because "the Court cannot make substantive rules by any means other than writing opinions in
'cases or controversies,' without taking leave of its role as defined by Article III. ' '226 As Professor Carrington has concluded, "[b]y shielding substantive rights from abridgment and
modification, the first sentence of the Act expresses constitu''
tional principles that derive from Article III. 227
221. See cases cited supra note 218.
222. See Business Guides, 111 S. Ct. at 933-34; Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 156-57;
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 463-68; Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. at 113-14; Mackey, 351 U.S.
at 433 n.5; Murphree, 326 U.S. at 445-46; Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 7-14.
223. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1988).
224. Prior to being amended in 1988, § 2072 had provided: "Such rules
shall not take effect until they have been reported to Congress by the Chief
Justice at or after the beginning of a regular session thereof but not later than
the first day of May, and until the expiration of ninety days after they have
been thus reported." 28 U.S.C.A. § 2072 (West 1982) (repealed 1988).
225. Carrington, supra note 210, at 286.
226. Id.at 287.
227. 1id. Professor Carrington makes the additional argument that the
Rules Enabling Act supersession clause further confirms the constitutional al-
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Although Congress, in the Civil Justice Reform Act, has
claimed an exclusive rulemaking authority, there are both constitutional and statutory limitations on Congress's role in the
rulemaking process. Indeed, for separation-of-powers purposes
one may view the Rules Enabling Act as a codification of the
constitutional limits. The constitutional limitation prevents
Congress from compromising the constitutional independence
of the judiciary by invading the inherent power of the judiciary
to create rules of practice and procedure for the courts. The
statutory limitation allocates the substantive law-making function to the legislative branch, and the procedural rule-making
function to the courts.228 Congress, under the Rules Enabling
Act, possesses a supervisory role of reviewing court-promulgated rules prior to their becoming law to ensure that such
rules do not trench on Congress's substantive law-making function.229 This allocation of authority is reinforced by the judicial
review process, which also ensures that the rulemaking allocation is not transgressed when the courts exercise their
rulemaking power.
Whatever else may be said about the Civil Justice Reform
Act, its various and detailed prescriptions to the advisory
groups do not constitute substantive law-making by Congress.
The provisions of the Act clearly represent a lengthy series of
procedural rules. And although Sibbach and its progeny provide an inapt analytical framework for construing the constitutional or statutory legitimacy of the Civil Justice Reform Act,
even under the most liberal view of the substance/procedure
distinction these cases embody, it cannot be contended that the
provisions of the Act are anything other than congressionallycommanded procedural rulemaking. In enacting this statute,
then, Congress has interfered with the constitutionally-required and historically-based allocation of rulemaking authority
embodied in the Rules Enabling Act.
Perhaps the best view of rulemaking authority is that it is
a constitutionally- and statutorily-shared power, to be exercised
in coordination by the legislative and judicial branches. 230 This
perspective certainly comports with a contemporary, functionlocation of lawmaking and rulemaking authority to the legislative and judicial
branches, respectively. See id at 322-26.
228. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1988).
229. 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (1988).
230. See, e.g., WEINSTEIN, supra note 193, at 92 (arguing that for decades, if
not centuries, control over practice and procedure has been the subject of concurrent jurisdiction); Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 180, at 3 (same); Martin,
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alist view of the separation-of-powers doctrine, under which
neither branch may reasonably make an exclusive institutional
claim to rulemaking authority. 231 Yet when an interbranch
conflict arises, as with the Civil Justice Reform Act, the most
appropriate conflict-resolving principle consistent with separation-of-powers doctrine is that "the branch to which the power
has been delegated or is inherent prevails." 232 The separationof-powers doctrine requires inherent branch power to prevail
over coordinate branch delegative authority.23 3 Thus, if the
promulgation of procedural rules is an indispensable inherent
attribute of judicial power, the exercise of that power by another branch is impermissible under the separation-of-powers
2 4
doctrine. 3
2. The 1988 Amendment to the Rules Enabling Act and Its
Implications for the Civil Justice Reform Act
In 1988, Congress amended the Rules Enabling Act. The
amended Act stated more succinctly the power of the Supreme
Court to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure for
the district courts, 235 removed the provision relating to congressional approval of judicially promulgated rules,236 and recast
the supersession clause. 237 None of the 1988 amendments, however, altered the constitutional allocation of rulemaking authority between the legislative and judicial branches. Congress
retained intact the basic principle that the Supreme Court
promulgates procedural rules for the federal courts. Significantly, Congress deleted all references to congressional oversight of the judicial rulemaking process. 238 More importantly,
supra note 178, at 176-202 (discussing the view that both the Congress and the
courts have authority to prescribe rules of evidence).
231. See supra notes 103-22 and accompanying text (discussing separation
problems between the legislative and judicial branches).
232. Martin, supra note 178, at 185.
233. Id at 184.
234. IdR
at 184-85.
235. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702,
§ 401(a), 102 Stat. 4642, 4648-50 (1988) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2072-2074 (1988 & Supp. II 1990)).
236. See id
237. Section 2072(b) now provides that "[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right. All laws in conflict with such rules
shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect." 28
U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1988).
238. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100702, tit. IV, 102 Stat. 4642, 4648-52 (1988) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2072-2074 (1988 & Supp. II 1990)). In 1990 Congress added a further provi-
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the 1988 amendments revised the implementation section of the
Rules Enabling Act to open public access to the rulemaking
239
process.
Both the Senate Judiciary subcommittee 240 and the Judicial Conference2 4 1 exploited the 1988 amendments to the Rules
Enabling Act in support of their respective views of the allocation of rulemaking authority between the legislative and judicial branches. The Senate Judiciary subcommittee interpreted
the 1988 amendments to support its claim to exclusive rulemaking authority,242 while the Judicial Conference tactically construed these revisions as a congressional reaffirmation of the
basic allocation of procedural rulemaking authority in the judicial branch.243 The Judicial Conference view is probably better,
because the 1988 amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 2073 cannot be
read as changing the fundamental allocation of rulemaking authority embodied in § 2072. Significantly, not only did Congress
amend § 2072 without declaring itself the exclusive rulemaking
authority, it also eliminated altogether any reference to its role
in the rulemaking process. The 1988 amendments to § 2073
were basically political concessions to enhance democratic participation in the procedural rulemaking process, and simply
cannot support a bootstrap argument for exclusive congressional authority over the procedural rulemaking process. 244
sion to § 2072, providing that "[s]uch rules may define when a ruling of a district court is final for the purposes of appeal under section 1291 of this title."
Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. III, § 315, 104 Stat.
5089, 5115 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2072(c) (Supp. II 1990)).
239. See 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (1988). The new provisions enhanced the opportunity for public participation in the judicial rulemaking process. See generally Paul D. Carrington, The New Order In Judicial Rulemaking, 75
JUDICATURE 161, 164 (1991) [hereinafter Carrington, The New Order] (describing the impetus of the 1988 revisions to the Rules Enabling Act). Section
2073(c)(1) provides for public meetings and minutes of proceedings. Section
2073(d)(1) requires explanatory commentary for proposed rule revisions. An
attempt to require that the advisory rules committees consist of a "balanced
cross section of bench and bar" was deleted from the final 1988 revisions to the
Rules Enabling Act. See Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules To Dispose of
Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-TransSubstantive Rules of Civil Procedure,137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 2076 n.56 (1989)
[hereinafter Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded
Assertions] (citing H.R. 3550, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. H11,397-98
(daily ed. Dec. 9, 1985)).
240. See Mullenix, supra note 9, at 428-29.
241. Id at 416-17.
242. Id. at 428-29.
243. Id, at 416-17.
244. Even so viewed, these provisions are rather meager gestures to the requirements of due process. The 1988 amendments have enhanced the judicial
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B. THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT AND THE RULES
ENABLING ACT

1. The Inversion of Rulemaking Authority Embodied in the
Civil Justice Reform Act
The Civil Justice Reform Act represents a peculiar and disturbing inversion of the usual allocation of rulemaking author-

ity.245 In separation-of-powers terms, the Rules Enabling Act
codifies Congress's legislative power to enact substantive laws
and the federal judiciary's judicial power to enact rules of practice and procedure for proceedings in its courts. The language
of the Rules Enabling Act and the cases construing it have at a
minimum always recognized this division of lawmaking and
rulemaking authority.2 46 The only dispute has centered on discerning which matters are "substantive" and which are "procedural." 247 But even in instances of rulemaking at the margins
of the substance/procedure divide, as well as instances of
clearly procedural rulemaking, the judicial branch has always
retained and exercised the power over procedural rulemaking.
In the Civil Justice Reform Act, in contrast, Congress has mandated purely procedural rules. The Act's various and detailed
provisions do not in any way implicate Congress's substantive
lawmaking powers, and it would clearly distort the Act to even
suggest that it is substantive law.
The Act has, in fact, accomplished an "end run" around the
usual rulemaking process.2 8 But the implications of the Civil
rulemaking process by requiring advance notice of advisory committee meetings, written minutes, and explanatory and dissenting statements regarding
proposed rule revisions, as well as providing an opportunity for the public to
attend committee meetings. The amendments do not, however, incorporate an
opportunity to be heard, see 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (1988), a traditional hallmark of
procedural due process in provisional remedies cases, see, e.g., Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-81 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337,
339-42 (1969); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 31314 (1950).
245. Mullenix, supra note 9, at 379-81.
246. See supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text.
247. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
248. Thomas E. Baker, An Introduction To Federal CourtRulemaking Procedure, 22 TEX. TECH L. REV. 323, 333 (1991). Professor Baker writes:
Although previously passive, during the last two decades Congress has
taken a more active role to change proposed rules and to preempt altogether the judicial rulemaking procedure. The increased Congressional involvement makes for a more persistent separation-of-powers
threat from the Congressional direction. This happens when Congress passes a statute to effect a rule change and thus execute a kind
of "end run" around the established regular judicial rulemaking
procedures.
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Justice Reform Act are even more extreme than that. Without
repealing, modifying, or amending the Rules Enabling Act,
Congress simply has ignored both the constitutional and the
statutory allocation of rulemaking authority, and has arrogated
to itself the exclusive authority to do whatever it wants, including creating procedural rules for courts. Furthermore, Congress has accomplished this feat by simply declaring all
procedural rules to be of "substantive effect," 249 a declaration
that suggests Congress at least understood the need to couch its
usurpation of a traditionally judicial function in terms of a legislative prerogative. If Congress is correct in its bald assertion-and it is not-then we are at the end the age of
procedure, for there'250
can be no procedural rules when all are of
"substantive effect.

The Rules Enabling Act exists to preserve the independence of judicial rulemaking from the political process. In the
Civil Justice Reform Act, Congress has invaded the judicial
function and infused the procedural rulemaking process with
partisan politics. The Rules Enabling Act is just that: a statute
that "enables" the Supreme Court to exercise its inherent procedural rulemaking function. Although the Constitution assigns Congress the power to create inferior courts and confer
on them jurisdiction, once created these courts have inherent
power to promulgate rules of practice and procedure not in contravention of substantive law. If the Rules Enabling Act did
not exist, courts would still have this power. The Senate's legislative history to the Civil Justice Reform Act, however, igdoctrine and distorts the
nores separation-of-powers
interpretation of the Rules Enabling Act to divest the federal
judiciary of its long-standing procedural rulemaking authority.
2.

Rulemaking as a Matter of Public Policy

The Senate Judiciary subcommittee's legislative history
cites to Sibbach, Hanna,and a sentence from Judge Jack Weinstein's book on procedural rulemaking for its assertion of exclusive rulemaking authority.251 In truth, Judge Weinstein
recognized that neither branch can lay exclusive claim to
Id. He then cites as the best example of this phenomenon the then-proposed
Civil Justice Reform Act. Id. at 333 n.58. He speculates that the bill offers a
scenario that is a "worst [case] example that might not be imaginable by the
judges." Id
249. See Mullenix, supra note 9, at 379, 432-34, 437.
250. Id. at 379-82.
251. See id. at 426.
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rulemaking authority, and that in the end this concurrent
power devolved into "a policy question where a series of arguments... must be weighed and balanced." 2
Judge Weinstein's outline of these countervailing policy arguments is a good one, and it provides a durable framework for
thinking about the rulemaking process as a policy question.
The arguments he recognized are these: first, "[t]he federal judiciary has an unprecedented history of judicial independence
from the other branches," 253 an independence that is based on
the judiciary's power to formulate procedural rules. Further,
"[f]or courts to surrender this power to the legislature is to give
up a crucial aspect of their duty to fairly determine cases and
Second, the "[c]ourts have an intimate
controversies." '
knowledge of the need for particular rules to govern court
processes not possessed by the legislative branch." 5 Third,
the legislature has the authority to issue general rules, and procedural "[r]ule-making must inevitably be classed as such a legislative prerogative [because] it is far closer to the people's
wishes than the courts." 6 Thus, to allow the judiciary to
make procedural rules would be to invite court abuses. Fourth,
only the legislature is sufficiently detached from the fine details of judicial procedures to evaluate objectively the need to
alter such procedures.2 7 And fifth, procedural rules "inevitably affect practical substantive rights, including those adopted
by Congress." 258 As such, the legislature must protect the substantive rights it provides.
Judge Weinstein does not assess the merits of his arguments, although he clearly favors more participatory process in
judicial rulemaking, a position forged through his experiences
in the 1970s serving on various advisory committees. 259 Yet
Judge Weinstein's majoritarian preference may be viewed as a
peculiar consequence of the political climate of that time, for
his policy arguments fail to consider other concerns that are
relevant to the rulemaking process in the 1990s. Judge Wein252. WEINSTEIN, supra note 193, at 54.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id
256. Id.
257. Id. at 55.
258. Id. Needless to say, Judge Weinstein's actual account of the relative
allocation of rulemaking authority between the two branches is more highly
nuanced than the legislative history to the Civil Justice Reform Act indicates.
259. See id. at 8-11.
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stein's first two arguments are based in a separation theory of
judicial independence and a model of expertise, while his last
two are based in a separation theory of legislative prerogative
and a model of majoritarian rule. His third argument expresses
his hypothesized fear of anti-majoritarian rulemaking, sum260
moning dreaded judicial abuses of another era.

Judge Weinstein's arguments are incomplete, however, because they fail to recognize another hypothesized fear of legislated (as opposed to judicially-promulgated) procedural rules:
the fear of interest group lobbying.26 1 Judge Weinstein fears
the creation of procedural rules by insulated judges acting on
their own prejudices,26 2 but others equally fear the creation of
procedural rules by political actors operating pursuant to the
dictates of partisan interests. In the end, the policy question relating to rulemaking allocation is not a debate between models
of expertise and non-expertise, but a policy question relating to
majoritarian rule.
The ultimate question is whether it is desirable to have
majoritarian procedural rules. The answer to this question
must be no. The judicial branch is not a majoritarian branch.
It seems absurd to suggest that the populace ought to vote on,
for example, summary judgment procedure, pretrial practice,
or judgments notwithstanding the verdict. The constitutional
role of the judiciary in deciding cases and controversies was intended to be insulated from political pressure, yet the Civil Justice Reform Act strips the judiciary of its rulemaking function
and infuses partisan politics into the process of determining the
260. Id. (citing the "abuses that arose in early nineteenth-century
England").
261. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 248, at 337 (providing the address of the
Secretary of the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure and urging
readers to write in their suggestions and recommendations on any of the federal rules); Carrington, The New Order, supra note 239, at 161-67; Carrington,
supra note 210, at 301-02, 326-27 (arguing that the withdrawal of procedural
rulemaking from the political arena has allowed for the advancement of the
interests of persons with less political power); Carrington, Making Rules To
Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions, supra note 239, at 2074-79 (discussing the influence of interest group politics on proposed amendments to
Rule 68); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Undemocratic Legislation, 87 YALE L.J. 1284
(1978) (reviewing JACK B. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES (1977), and contending that lawyer-legislators have inordinate influence on the few procedural rules that do emanate from Congress); Mullenix,
supra note 18, at 801-02, 834-44, 855-57 (arguing that partisan law reformers
have abandoned the judicial arena as the forum for achieving social changes,
and instead are focusing legal reform efforts on the rules and rulemaking process, with worrisome consequences).
262. WEINSTEIN, supra note 193, at 8-11, 54-55.
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procedural rules that govern the conduct of cases. The Act represents, then, a usurpation by the majoritarian branch of a
power intended to be insulated from majoritarian politics.
This is dangerous, not only as a matter of constitutional
law, but also as a matter of public policy, because the Civil Justice Reform Act is a monumental step in the further politicization of the rulemaking process. Whatever may have been the
failings of judicial branch rulemaking,26 3 the deleterious effects
of majoritarian rulemaking will be tenfold. Judges, for all their
Realist infirmities, 2 64 at a minimum were guided in their
rulemaking efforts by a commonly-shared philosophy of procedural rules. 265 The new populist rulemakers, one fears, will be
guided solely by differing self-interests and special interests.
CONCLUSION
This two-part Article has attempted to describe the Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1990, the political climate in which it was
conceived and enacted, and the danger it presents to the constitutional allocation of authority in our government. The Civil
Justice Reform Act was enacted to address an assumed but unsubstantiated crisis in civil litigation in this country. Couched
in high-minded rhetoric concerning reform from "the bottom
up" by "users" of the system, the legislation purports to
263. See generally WINIFRED R. BROWN, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: PROBLEMS
AND PossmILmES (1981) (discussing criticism that the Court has interpreted
its rulemaking authority too broadly); Jack H. Friedenthal, The Rulemaking
Power of the Supreme Court" A Contemporary Crisis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 673
(1975) (arguing that the shortcomings of the 1970 work product rule robably
would have been prevented if the Court had properly attended to its rulemaking functions); Howard Lesnick, The FederalRulemaking Process: A Time For
Re.Examination, 61 A.B.A. J. 579 (1975) (arguing that the current judicial
rulemaking process should be reformed to be more open and representative,
and that a workable mode of congressional review be devised); Russell R.
Wheeler, Broadening Participationin the Courts Through Rule-Making and
Administration, 62 JUDICATURE 280 (1979) (arguing that judicial rulemaking
has become a vehicle through which a variety of interests groups may participate in court operations); Charles A. Wright, ProceduralRefornv Its Limitations and its Future, 1 GA. L. REv. 563 (1967) (discussing limitations
characteristic of judicial rules reform).
264. See Carrington, supra note 210, at 287.
265. See, e.g., Carrington, Making Rules To Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions, supra note 239, at 2079-85 (discussing the general applicability of procedural rules); Carrington, supra note 210, at 301-07 (describing a
philosophy of procedural rulemaking characterized by the values of substantive and political neutrality, generalism, flexibility, forgiveness, integrality,
and judicial professionalism).
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achieve, through extensive procedural rulemaking reform, reductions in the cost and delay of civil litigation.
In truth, however, the Civil Justice Reform Act is a highly
political piece of legislation, a cynical attempt by Congress not
only to wrest procedural rulemaking authority from the judiciary, but also to achieve substantive legal change in a disguised,
politically palatable fashion. The Act is not about civil justice
reform at all; instead, it has effectuated a late-twentieth-century counter-reformation in procedural justice, totally undermining the progressive reforms accomplished since the
promulgation in 1938 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
In wrongly declaring for itself an exclusive rulemaking authority, Congress has acted brazenly and arrogantly. In denying that any separation-of-powers issues were presented by the
legislation, it has exerted a total legislative prerogative to the
enduring impairment of an independent judiciary. In distorting
the purpose and history of the Rules Enabling Act to justify its
right to promulgate procedural rules, Congress has repealed the
Rules Enabling Act sub silentio.
If the Civil Justice Reform Act is not declared unconstitutional, there will be no end to the continuing politicization of
the judicial branch. There will be no counter-majoritarian
branch, and no checks against majoritarian whim or interest
group demands. All branches of government will be political,
and the judicial process, too, will become subject to the loudest
and most effective voices. Even the fiction of judicial impartiality in construing the law cannot possibly prevail when the process of judicial procedure is itself infused with political
concerns.

